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Comments
INTERGOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITIES FROM TAXATION
The rising cost of national, state and local government enhanced by widespread unemployment, and accompanied by a decrease in taxable incomes, has
indicated during the past few years that an imperative need exists for a readjustment of major tax exemptions with a view toward their possible elimina-
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tion. 1 This re-examination of necessity must find its way into the maze of
governmental instrumentalities, which have grown up in the last few decades,
and which, due to the far-reaching construction placed upon the decision laid
down in McCulloch v. Maryland,2 have become insulated from would-be attempts
at taxation. An appreciation of this statement is readily seen when one considers the phenomenal growth of governmental agencies since the advent of the
New Deal. Since March, 1933, some twenty government owned or government
chartered corporations have been created. Such corporations as Electric Home
and Farm Authority,3 Federal Subsistence Homestead Corporation, 4 Emergency
Housing Corporation,. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 6 and the Tennessee
Valley Authority,7 as well as others which have sprung from the agricultural,
home building, and financing programs, have invaded the field of private enterprise, with the result that the current problem of legislators is to seek avenues
of escape from the "immunity doctrine."
To understand the nature of the problem affecting these legislators it is necessary to analyze the basic doctrines upon which exemptions have grown. Our
attention is of necessity drawn at the outset to considerations of the foundation
case of this doctrine, McCulloch v. Maryland, in which Chief Justice Marshall,
holding invalid a discriminatory tax by the State of Maryland against the
Bank of the United States, asserted that "the power to tax involves the power
to destroy; that the power to destroy may defeat and render useless the power
to create; . . ." and that "the States have no power, by taxation or otherwise, to retard, impede, burden, or in any manner control, the operations of the
constitutional laws enacted by congress to carry into execution the powers vested
in the general government. '8 (Italics supplied).
This case, of course, applied only to the state's relations to the federal
government, and it was not until 1870 that this doctrine was applied e converso
in Collector v. Day,9 where an attempt by Congress to impose a tax upon the
salary of a judicial officer of a state was successfully blocked, when Mr. Justice
Nelson boomeranged the doctrine of federal immunity by reasoning that, "if
the means and instrumentalities employed by that government to carry into
operation the powers granted to it are, necessarily, and, for the sake of selfpreservation, exempt from taxation by the States, why are not those of the

1. Note (1931) 41 YAI. L. J. 1237.
2. 4 Wheat. 316 (U. S. 1819).
3. Electric Home and Farm Authority Executive Order No. 6514, Dec.
19, 1933.
4. Pub. L. No. 67, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. (1933) § 208.
5. Executive Order No. 6470, Nov. 29, 1933.
6. 48 STAT. 168 (1933), 12 U. S. C. § 264 (Supp. 1935).
7. 48 STAT. 58 (1933), 16 U. S. C. § 831 (Supp. 1935).
8. McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 431, 436 (U. S. 1819).
9. 11 Wall. 113 (U. S. 1870).
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States depending upon their reserved powers, for like reasons, equally exempt
from Federal taxation?"lo
In the period between the decisions in McCulloch v. Maryland" and Collector v. Day,lla other decisions were rendered by the Court which expanded
the immunity doctrine originally asserted by Mr. Chief Justice Marshall. Such
familiar cases as Dobbins v. Commissioners of Erie County12 (in which it was
held that a state could not tax the salary of a federal officer), Weston v. Charleston 3 (in which state attempts to tax United States stock owned by individual
citizens was held to be a burden on the power to borrow money on the credit of
the United States), Bank Tax Case,14 Bank of Commerce v. New York City,1
United States v. Baltimore & Ohio R. R.,16 Union Pacific R. R. v. Peniston, l
and Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co.,' all point toward a general scheme
of expansion of the immunity doctrine with its reciprocal feature. The case
of South Carolina v. United States19 was the first to vary from the beaten
path set by the fundamental doctrines of these early cases.

10. Id. at 127.
11. 4 Wheat. 316 (U. S. 1819).
Ila. 11 Wall. 113 (U. S. 1870).
12. 16 Pet. 435 (U. S. 1842).
13. 2 Pet. 449 (U. S. 1829).
14. 2 Wall. 200 (U. S. 1864). Here a tax laid by a state on banks, on a
valuation equal to the amount of their capital stock paid in, or secured to be
paid in, was considered as a tax on the property of the institution, and when
the property consisted of stocks of the federal government, the law laying the
tax was void.
15. 2 Black 620 (U. S. 1862). This case held that a tax on the capital
stock of a bank was a tax on the property in which the capital was invested,
and therefore such part of the capital as was invested in United States bonds
must be excluded from assessment. Professor T. R. Powell, in his most enlightening article, Indirect Encroachment on Federal Authority By The Taxing Powers of the States (1919) 32 HARv. L. REv. 902, 914, stated: "It is clear
that in Bank Tax Case and Bank of Commerce v. New York City, the Supreme Court meant to protect Federal securities from state taxation in any
form. A court could hardly be expected to do otherwise while the Civil War
was raging and the government at Washington needed all the support to its
credit that was available. It was no time for nice discriminations between
burdens and denials of bounties. A few years later, however, when the conflict between the states had ended, a majority of the Supreme Court allowed
a state to impose a tax on the privilege of being a corporation and measure
the amount by assets which included United States bonds." Society for Savings v. Coite, 6 Wall. 594 (U. S. 1868).
16. 17 Wall. 322 (U. S. 1872). This case is important for deciding that
a municipal corporation is a portion of the sovereign power of the State, and
is not subject to taxation by Congress upon its municipal revenues.
17. 18 Wall. 5 (U. S.1873), presents a question as to the validity of a tax
by a state upon the real and personal property as distinguished from its franchises, of the Union Pacific Railroad, a corporation chartered by Congress for
private gain, and whose stock is all owned by individuals, but which Congress
assisted by donations and loans. The tax was held valid.
18. 157 U. S.429 (1895). The Court failed to sustain a tax upon income
derived from the interest on bonds issued by a municipality, and decided that
it was a tax upon the power of the state and its instrumentalities to borrow
money and therefore was repugnant to the Constitution of the United States.
Cf. Willcuts v. Bunn, 282 U. S. 216 (1931).
19. 199 U. S.437, 454 (1905) presents the question as to whether persons
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The "handwriting on the wall" was seen by Mr. Justice Bradley in his
dissenting opinion in Collector v. Day,20 when he predicted that the mischievous
consequences of state immunity would cause the Court no end of difficulties in
enumerating the functions of the state government which would be free from
interference by the federal government. His prediction was borne out in 1905,
21
by the Court's announcement in the South Carolina case, that the principle
of immunity was subject to a limitation and protected only the essential or
strictly governmental functions of a state, a distinction marking a division between these functions and instrumentalities, and those of a commercial or proprietary nature.
The South Carolina case involved an attempt by the State of South Carolina to cast about its liquor activities the cloak of tax immunity. This was met
by the argument that sustaining such an immunity would pave a clear path for
the states to enter into the field of private enterprise, and thus remove many
of the federal government's most profitable sources of revenue. The Supreme
Court has never announced any modification of the South Carolina doctrine,
22
Also, many times since that
and many times has declared it to be the law.

who are selling liquor are relieved from liability for the internal revenue tax
by reason of the fact that they. are merely agents of a state which has taken
charge of the business of selling liquors. The economic theory in back of this
case is well expressed where the Court says, "Mingling the thought of profit
with the necessity of regulation may induce the State to take possession, in
like manner, of tobacco, oleomargarine, and all other objects of internal revenue tax. If one State finds it thus profitable other States may follow, and the
whole body of internal revenue tax be thus stricken down."
20. 11 Wall. 113, 129 (U. S. 1870).
21. South Carolina v. United States, 199 U. S. 437 (1905).
22. A case squarely in point is Ohio v. Helvering, 292 U. S. 360 (1934),
in which the state of Ohio moved to file a complaint invoking original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to enjoin the Commissioner of Internal Revenue from
levying and collecting excise taxes on the state wholesale and retail liquor distributors. The motion was denied, on the ground that this was a private business and not a governmental function; that the police power as applied to
business is to regulate it, and not to engage in it. Justice Sutherland applied
the novel argument that, "When a state enters the market place seeking customers it divests itself of its quasi sovereignty pro tanto, and takes on the
character of a trader, so far, at least, as the taxing power of the federal government is concerned." Cf. Brush v. Commissioner, 300 U. S. 352 (1937). An
interesting question in light of the statement made by Justice Sutherland (above)
would be as to its application to a tax on a federal project like the T. V. A.,
where power is sold by the federal government in competition with private
dealers.
Helvering v. Powers, 293 U. S. 214 (1934) is another case in which South
Carolina v. U. S., 199 U. S. 437 (1905), was cited as the ruling case. The
Powers case determined that municipal rendition of public utility services represents proprietary activity, and therefore still subject to a tax. Cf. Brush
v. Commissioner, 300 U. S. 352 (1937).
It should be noted in passing that Justice Sutherland in commenting on
what are state governmental functions in Brush v. Commissioner, at 371, explained that, "Governmental functions are not to be regarded as non-existent
because they are held in abeyance, or because they lie dormant, for a time.
If they be by their nature governmental, they are none the less so because the
use of them has had a recent beginning." Cf. this statement with the state-
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decision, the Supreme Court of the United States has said that the immunity
of a state or its instrumentalities from taxation by the federal government was
absolutely equal and reciprocal to the exemption of the federal government and
its instrumentalities from taxation by the states, 23 but no case has ever expressly stated that the doctrine of South Carolin v. United States applies to the
United States and its instrumentalities. Of course, at the time this decision was
rendered, the federal government had not as yet engaged in the corporate activities which have become so widespread in the last decade, but this is no
basis for the Court to disregard the reciprocity feature of the immunity doctrine as it should apply to questions of taxing the activities of the new federal
24
enterprises.
It has been argued by some students of this question that the principle
of South Carolina v. United States can, from its nature, only apply to state
immunity from federal taxation, because the United States is a government of
enumerated powers, and therefore, anything the United States government does,
must, of necessity, be governmental and therefore immune from state taxation. The states have unlimited powers except as curtailed by the United
States Constitution, and, therefore, can engage in either private or govern25
mental activities.
It was believed by many, however, that this distinction between federal
powers and state powers could not stand in view of the language of Mr. Justice
Stone in Metcalf & Eddy v. Mitchell, and in United States v. State of California.
In the former he asserted that "the very nature of our constitutional system
of dual sovereign governments is such as impliedly to prohibit the federal government from taxing the instrumentalities of a state government, and in a
similar nanner to limit the power of the states to tax the instrumentalities of
the federal government. . . . Just what instrumentalities of either a state
or the federal government are exempt from taxation by the other can not be
stated in terms of universal application. But this Court has repeatedly held
that those agencies through which either government immediately and directly
exercises its sovereign powers, are immune from the taxing power of the
other." 26 (Italics supplied).

ment in United States v. California, 297 U. S. 175, 185 (1936), which stated
that governmental activities are those "activities in which the states have traditionally engaged." (Italics supplied.)
23. Metcalf & Eddy v. Mitchell, 269 U. S. 514, 521 (1926); Willcuts v.
Bunn, 282 U. S. 216, 225 (1931); Indian Motorcycle v. United States, 283 U.
S. 570, 577 (1931); Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U. S. 393 (1932);
Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U. S. 123, 128 (1932); United States v. California,
297 U. S. 175, 184 (1936).
24. Note (1932) 22 VA. L. REv. 98. See Stoke, State Taxation and thd
New Federal Instrumentalities (1936) 22 IowA L. REv. 39, 42; and Morrison,
Some Recent Decisions on the Law of Taxation (1934) 22 CALM. L. Ruv. 277.
25. Stoke, State 'Taxation and the New Federal Instrumentalities (1936)
22 IowA L. Rnv. 39, 43.
26. Metcalf & Eddy v. Mitchell, 269 U. S. 514, 521 (1926).
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In the latter case it was stated that "the constitutional immunity of state
instrumentalities from federal taxation . . . is implied from the nature of
our federal system and the relationship within it of state and national governments, and is equally a restriction on taxation by either of the instrumentalities
of the other. Its nature requires that it be so construed as to allow to each
government reasonable scope for its taxing power . .
which would be unduly curtailed if either by extending its activities could withdraw from the taxing power of the other subjects of taxation traditionally within it." 2 7 (Italics
supplied).
Thus, it seemed if the principle of inter-governmental immunity from taxation were fully reciprocal-and this could only be true if the limitation of
South Carolina v. United States applied to the immunity of both governmentsit would follow that if the United States can tax the instrumentalities of the
states which are not essentially governmental, the states can also tax instrumentalities authorized by the United States which are likewise not essentially governmental. 28 It should be noted, however, that both of these cases involved only
the application of the federal tax to an enterprise operated by the state.
It remained for 1939 to find the Court dealing squarely with this problem
as applied to an enterprise carried on by the national government and accepting
the above suggestion that, since it is a government of enumerated powers, whatever it legally may undertake must be considered the performance of a governmental function. That, however, coupled with a reexamination of the basis for
the doctrine of immunity resulted in denial of immunity to employees engaged
in the national undertaking, since no actual interference with the activity of
the national government was found to exist.2 9
"In its application of the rule developed from MeCulloch v. Maryland
the Supreme Court has varied between a doctrinal approach which tends to
condemn the tax falling in any degree upon a government instrumentality, and
an economic analysis which may condone the tax whose burden upon the function
is slight. 30o Recent decisions indicate a departure from the strict application
of the doctrinal approach, and show an adoption of the economic approach as

27. United States v. California, 297 U. S. 175, 184 (1936).
28. See State ex rel. Baumann v. Bowles, 115 S. W. (2d) 805 (Mo. 1938),
holding that the Missouri income tax levied on the salary of an employee of
the Farm Credit Administration, a federal agency, was valid. In answer
to whether the doctrine of South Carolina v. United States, 199 U. S. 437 (1905),
applied to federal agencies, the Court said, "If the immunity of state and federal instrumentalities is equal, it would seem to follow, under the ruling in
the South Carolina case, supra, that a federal agency engaged 'in a business
which is of a private nature' would not be immune from state taxation." In
application to the Farm Credit Administration, the Court determined it could
be taxed because the business of the agency was of a private nature, and its
activities were not those of the traditional federal government activities.
29. Graves v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe, 59 Sup. Ct. 595 (1939).
30. Developments In the Law: Taxation-1983 (1934) 47 HARv. L. R-v.
1209.
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a basis for determining the validity of the tax.31 It is not the purpose of the
present writer to trace the varying trends of the Court since McCulloch v. Maryland as applied to the immunity problem, but rather to set forth the important
cases of recent years in which the Court has indicated an adoption of the economic approach.
Mr. Justice Stone sounded the keynote to this new approach when he asserted in Metcalf & Eddy v. Mitchell that "the limitation upon the taxing power
of each, so far as it affects the other, must receive a practical construction which
permits both to function with the minimum of interference each with the other;
and that limitation cannot be so varied or extended as seriously to impair either
the taxing power of the government imposing the tax . . . or the appropri(Ital. .,"
ate exercise of the functions of the government affected by it.
ics supplied).
This practical construction as set out above was given effect in Willcuts v.
Bunn, when a realistic attempt was made to consider a tax from the point of
view of its actual effect, whether immediate or remote, upon essential state
functions. This case decided that the profit derived from the sale of municipal
bonds could properly be subjected to the federal income tax, in the absence of
a showing that any appreciable burden was thereby cast on the state's borrowing power. Here, Chief Justice Hughes deviated from any doctrinal approach
to the problem involved, when he asserted that, "if the tax now in question
is to be condemned, it must be because of practical consequences and not because purchases and sales by private owners of state and municipal bonds are
a part of the State's action in borrowing money" and, further that if such a
tax would not be sustained, "it must clearly appear that a substantial burden
33
(Italics
upon the borrowing power of the State would actually be imposed."
supplied).
As a result of this case (Willcuts v. Bunn), serious doubt was raised as to
whether the Court would again adhere to its reasoning in a case like Macallen
Co. v. Massachusetts,3 4 where it was held that a state could not impose a tax

31. Id.
32. Metcalf & Eddy v. Mitchell, 269 U. S. 514, 523, 524 (1926). See McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 436 (U. S. 1819), where Chief Justice Marshall says: "The result is a conviction that the States have no power, by taxation or otherwise, to retard,impede, burden, or in any manner control, the operations of the constitutional laws enacted by congress to carry into execution
the powers vested in the general government." (Italics supplied). Of. with
Union Pac. R. R. v. Peniston, 18 Wall. 5, 36 (U. S. 1873), in which Justice
Story said: "It is, therefore, manifest that exemption of Federal agencies from
State taxation is dependent, not upon the nature of the agents, or upon the
mode of their constitution, or upon the fact that they are agents, but upon the
effect of the tax; that is, upon the question whether the tax does in truth deprive them of power to serve the government as they were intended to serve
it, or does hinder the efficient exercise of their power." (Italics supplied).
33. Willcuts v. Bunn, 282 U. S. 216, 229, 231 (1931).
34. 279 U. S. 620, 629 (1929). The doctrinal immunity approach reached
its logical conclusion in the majority opinion of Justice Sutherland, when he
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upon domestic corporations by including in their income, interest derived from
government bonds held by it. The Court in the Macallen case adhered to the
maintenance of the doctrinal immunity and deliberately rejected the test of
practical effect, when it considered that such a tax would be a burden upon the
government's borrowing power.
Helping to blaze the trail for an economic approach has been the case of
Fox Film Corporation v. Doyal,35 which held that a state could tax income derived from copyrights, and thus directly overruled Long v. Rockwood, 36 which
held otherwise as to patents. It should be noted that this was an unanimous
opinion, and furthermore that it has left the Supreme Court relatively free
to distinguish the enjoyment of a federal privilege from the exercise of a governmental function. This latter distinction has already made its significance felt,
for it has been made the basis for refusing to extend the immunity from state
87
excise taxation to federal power and warehouse licenses.
As a result of many of the decisions previously mentioned, a majority of the
Court appeared to be in full readiness to accept the economic approach to tag
immunity, and therefore, it was not particularly surprising when the Court
3
at its last term rendered the decision in Helvering v. Therrelt,
9 which sustained the right of the United States to tax state employees whose business
was to aid in liquidating insolvent corporations by virtue of a state statute.
The significance of this case lies in the fact that the opinion was handed down
by Mr. Justice McReynolds, one of the staunchest conservatives on the Court,
and particularly because the Justice approved the language of Burnet v. Jergins,

said that "the controlling principle, constantly to be borne in mind, is that the
state cannot tax the instrumentalities or bonds of the United States, or, what is
the same thing, the income derived therefrom, directly or indirectly-that is
to say, it cannot tax them in any form." (Italics supplied). Cf. Justice Stone's
dissent, in which Holmes and Brandeis concurred, at p. 637.
35. 286 U. S. 123 (1932). See Educational Films Corp. v. Ward, 282 U.
S. 379, 395 (1931). Justice Sutherland again disclosed the philosophy of the
doctrinal approach in his dissent in the Educational Films case, when he said;
"And, although it may be conceded that a tax measured by income derived from
copyrights does not impose a burden upon the exercise of a vital power of the
federal government, as it would in the case of federal bonds, it is, nevertheless,
a tax falling upon income which is exempt in virtue of an implied prohibition
of the federal Constitution." (Italics supplied).
36. 277 U. S.142 (1928).
37. See Broad River Power Co. v. Query, 288 U. S. 178 (1933) (licensed
under the Federal Water Power Act); Federal Compress & Warehouse Co.
v. McLean, 291 U. S. 17, 23 (1934) (licensed under the United States Warehouse Act). In the latter case, Justice Stone asserted: "It can no longer be
thought that the enjoyment of a privilege conferred by either the national or a
state government upon the individual, even though to promote some governmental policy, relieves him from the taxation by the other of his property or
business used or carried on in the enjoyment of the privilege or of the profits
derived from it."
38. 303 U. S. 218 (1938). This case would seem to have added significance
in view of the fact that Justice McReynolds could have disposed of the case
on the very narrow point that the state wouldn't be harmed by such a tax,
directly or indirectly, since the salaries which were taxed came out of the corporate assets and not out of state funds.
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which stated that "the subject of the tax is so renote from any governmental
function as to render the effect of the exaction inconsiderable as respects the
activities of the city."39 (Italics supplied).
A more far reaching change in the Court's outlook with respect to the
general problem of immunity was indicated by the case of Helvering v. Mountain
Producers Corporation,40 which upheld by a 5 to 2 decision, the right of the
federal government to levy an income tax on the profits from the sale of oil
and gas by a lessee of state lands. Chief Justice Hughes, on behalf of the
Court which had steadily become imbued with the soundness of the economic
approach, gave this approach its fullest impetus when he declared: ". . . we
deem to be the controlling view-that immunity from non-discriminatory taxation sought by a private person for his property or gains because he is engaged in operations under a government contract or lease cannot be supported
by merely theoretical conceptions of interference with the functions of government. Regard must be had to substance and direct effects. And where it merely
appears that one operating under a government contract or lease is subjected
to a tax with respect to his profits on the same basis as others who are engaged in similar businesses, there is no sufficient ground for holding that the
effect upon the government is other than indirect and remote."41 (Italics supplied).
As a result of this above language the Chief Justice on behalf of the Court
expressed the conviction that the rulings in Gillispie v. Oklahona42 and Burnet
3
v. Coronado Oil & Gas CompanyU
were out of harmony with correct principles

39. 288 U. S. 508, 516 (1933). Here the Court upheld a federal tax upon
the receipts of the lessee of oil lands which belonged to the city of Long Beach,
California.
40. 303 U. S. 376 (1938). The language of this case would seem to overrule in effect each of the following cases: Panhandle Oil Co. v. Mississippi,
277 U. S. 218, 225 (1928) (in which it was held that a state tax imposed on
dealers in gasoline for the privilege of selling gasoline and measured at so
many cents per gallon of gas sold, is void under the federal Constitution as
applied to sales to instrumentalities of the United States, such as the Coast
Guard Fleet and a veterans' hospital); Indian Motocycle Co. v. United States,
283 U. S. 570 (1931) (which held a tax on the sale of a motor cycle which
was manufactured by the plaintiff could not be subject to a tax when the sale
was to the police department of a municipality); Graves v. Texas Co., 298 U.
S. 393 (1936) (holding that a tax on the storage or withdrawal from storage,
of gasoline sold to the federal government was a tax on something so essential
to the sale that it was tantamount to a tax on the sale itself and therefore
void). Cf. Liggett & Meyers Tobacco Co. v. United States, 299 U. S. 383
(1937), holding that a tax on the manufacture of tobacco sold to a state for free
distribution in a State Hospital would be valid.
41. 303 U. S.376, 386, 387 (1938).
42. Gillespie v. Oklahoma, 257 U. S. 501 (1922), held that an income tax
on profits secured from sale of oir and gas secured by a lessee of Indian landsthe Indians being wards of the federal government-was void.
43. Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U. S. 393, 398 (1932), held
that a lease of state school lands by the state to the oil company was an instrumentality of the state for the purpose of carrying out her duty in respect
of public schools, and that to tax the income of the lessee arising therefrom

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1939

9

1939]

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 4, Iss. 3 [1939], Art. 3
COMMENTS

and accordingly that they be, and that henceforth they were to be considered
overruled. This set at rest a great deal of criticism which had been hurled at
the latter two decisions, and relieved the Court from having to continue making
such thin distinctions as were found in the cases of Burnet v. A. T. Jergins Trust
Company,44 Marland v. United States, 45 and Indian Territory Illuminating Oil
46
Company v. Board of Equalization.
This decision indicated that the majority of the Court was prepared frankly
to turn its back on earlier cases which had always been regarded as of doubtful soundness and without any actual foundation in the Constitution upon which
to rest, and to look carefully to the economic effect of the tax in each case presented.
This process was given greater impetus by the last important tax case of the
1937 Supreme Court term,47 in which the Court upheld the application of the
federal income tax to employees of the Port of New York Authority in an opinion that appeared to clear the way for the repudiation of many earlier decisions
and marked a very definite limitation on the application of the intergovernmental
immunity doctrine. Mr. Justice Stone's opinion went back to the progenitor
case of McCullock v. Maryland, 48 the misapplication of whose dictum--"the
power to tax involves the power to destroy" is responsible for the present form
of this doctrine, to show that Mr. Chief Justice Marshall was there dealing
solely with a state tax that clearly discriminated against "the exercise by Congress of a national power", and while not purporting to overrule such cases
as Dobbins v. Erie County49 or Collector v. Day,50 asserted that any constitutional restriction raised by implication upon the taxing power granted to Congress
should be narrowly limited. "When enlargement (of immunity) proceeds beyond the necessity of protecting the state, the burden of the immunity is thrown

would amount to an imposition upon the lease itself and therefore void. (It
was in this case that Justice Stone, dissenting, asked that Gillespie v. Oklahoma
be overruled.) Realizing the narrowness of the Gillespie case, the Court declared its intention to limit the Gillespie decision closely to its facts.
44. 288 U. S. 508 (1933). See note 42, supra, for facts. Distinguished
from the Gillespie and Coronado cases on the grounds that in the latter two
cases the sovereign was acting as trustee of an express trust of the lands leased.
This was a differentiation without an economic basis.
45. 3 F. Supp. 611 (Ct. Cl. 1933), cert. denied, 290 U. S. 658 (1933). Held
that a tax on profit from resale of leases of Oklahoma oil lands was valid. It
was asserted that this was distinguishable from the Gillepie and Coronado
cases on the ground that the tax in the Marland case was not a tax on the
operations.
46. 288 U. S. 325 (1933), sustaining a state property tax on oil which
was the produce of land leased from an Indian, although mixed with oil from
other properties. This case was distinguished from Jaybird Mining Co. v. Weir,
271 U. S. 609 (1926), holding a similar tax invalid, the distinguishing factor
being that the Indian's royalty percentage had been segregated before the tax was
levied.
47. Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U. S. 405 (1938).
48. 4 Wheat. 316 (U. S. 1819).
49. 16 Pet. 435 (U. S. 1870).
50. 11 Wall. 113 (U. S. 1870).
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upon the national government with benefit only to a privileged class of taxpayers." 51 It was then asserted that certain "guiding principles of limitation for
holding the tax immunity of state instrumentalities to its proper function" must
be observed, the first of which is the exclusion from immunity of "activities
thought not to be essential to the preservation of state governments even though
2
the tax be collected from the state treasury"; 6 the other "forbids recognition
of the immunity when the burden on the state is so speculative and uncertain.
that if allowed it would restrict the federal taxing power without affording any
corresponding tangible protection to the state government. . . .,,13(Italics
supplied).
Concurring in a separate opinion and recognizing that it would be extremely
difficult, if not impossible, to reconcile the doctrine asserted in Collector v. Day
and later cases with the principles applied in upholding the tax in the instant
case, Mr. Justice Black called for a complete reexamination by the Court of
the entire subject of intergovernmental tax immunity. Whether or not prompted
by this demand, the Court embraced the next opportunity, which presented
itself in two cases on March 27, 1939, to make a substantial (though not exhaustive) reexamination of this doctrine.
In the case of Graves v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe,54 again speaking through
Mr. Justice Stone, and again as in the Gerhardt case with Justices Butler and
McReynolds dissenting, the Court sustained the application of New York's state
income tax to the salaries of employees of the Home Owners' Loan Corporation.
This case presented almost the exact counterpart of People ex rel. Rogers v.
Graves,5 5 decided in 1937, and sustaining the immunity of a government owned
corporation employee's salary from a state income tax. That case and Collector
v. Day were expressly overruled in an opinion vigorously reasserting the principle so recently set forth in the Gerhardt case. It was recognized that since
the national government is one of enumerated or delegated powers, all of its
activities must be placed in the category of the performance of governmental
functions and all must stand on a parity with respect to their constitutional
immunity from taxation. The only basis for any claim of such immunity was
clearly asserted to be the prevention of actual and undue interference by one
government with the governmental activities of the other, and there can be no

51. 304 U. S. 405, 416 (1938).
52. Referring to such cases as South Carolina v. United States, 199 U.
S. 437 (1905), and Ohio v. Helvering, 292 U. S. 360 (1934).
53. 304 U. S. 405, 420 (1938).
54. 59 Sup. Ct. 595 (1939). On the same day in an opinion by Mr. Justice
Black, the case of the State Tax Commission of Utah v. Van Cott was decided,
involving the application of Utah's income tax to the salary of an attorney for
the Reconstruction Finance Corporation and the Regional Agricultural Credit
Corporation. Complete reliance was placed on the O'Keefe decision, eliminating
the doctrine of intergovernmental immunity as a bar to application of the tax,
and the case was sent back for further consideration by the Utah court of the
state statute involved.
55. 299 U. S. 401 (1937).
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basis for implying such exemption for the government or any of its agencies
"from tax burdens which are unsubstantial or which courts are unable to
discern. . . . It follows that when exemption from state taxation is claimed
on the ground that the federal government is burdened by the tax

.

.

.

it

is in order to consider the nature and effect of the alleged burden.
.
,,6
Proceeding upon the principle thus asserted it was pointed out that the
tax was non-discriminatory, not in form or substance a tax on the Home Owners' Loan Corporation or its property, or to be paid out of its funds or those
of the government, but a tax laid upon the income of an employee which becomes the private property of the taxpayer and is paid from his private funds.
In making this analysis the Court asserted that "the theory, which once won
a qualified approval, that a tax on income is legally or economically a tax on
its source, is no longer tenable

.

.

.

and the only possible basis for im-

plying a constitutional immunity . .
is that the economic burden of the
tax is in some way passed on so as to impose a burden on the national government tantamount to an interference by one government with the other in the
performance of its functions." 57 It being determined that the purpose of the
immunity is only to prevent undue interference with one government by imposing upon it the tax burdens of the other, and not to confer benefits on the
employees or to give an advantage to government by enabling it to engage employees at salaries lower than paid by other employers for like services, the
Court found no unconstitutional burden to exist in this case, and expressly repudiated the doctrine of "implied constitutional immunity from income taxation
of the salaries of officers or employees of the national or a state government
or their instrumentalities",58 as adhered to from 1870 with the decision of Col9
lector v. Day to the decision of Helvering v. Gerhardt5
in 1938.
If any indirect burden is cast upon government in the form of increased
costs for salaries by a non-discriminatory general tax upon incomes of employees, it must be considered merely a normal incident of the operations of the
national and state governmental systems within the same territory.
A concurring opinion by Mr. Justice Frankfurter, emphasizing that exactions by one government which discriminate against or obviously interfere
with the operations of the other are the only ones that come within the actual
decision in McCulloch v. Maryland, and admonishing the Court always to base
its determinations upon a fair conception of the Constitution rather than upon
some earlier unwarranted interpretation "encrusted" upon it, indicates the possibility of other changes yet to come, and adds a new and vigorous voice to the
numerous assertions of Justices Holmes, Brandeis, Stone and Black that the
doctrine of stare decisis finds small place in the field of constitutional law.

56. 59 Sup. Ct. 595, 598 (1939).
57. Id. at 598.
58. Id. at 601.
59. 304 U. S.405 (1938).
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The taxation of government securities was not involved in these most recent cases, but that the principles therein asserted will find application to that
situation appears open to very little doubt. The assertion that "the theory,
which once won a qualified approval, that a tax on income is legally or economically a tax on its source, is no longer tenable,' 0o would seem to clear the way
for interpreting the provision in the Sixteenth Amendment authorizing a tax
on incomes "from whatever source derived" to mean from whatever source derived. The extent to which Congress may in the future attempt, or be permitted,
to provide exemption is a matter for later consideration.
Underlying all of the cases on tax immunity of governmental instrumentalities has been two conflicting policies-one, to protect each government from
undue interference with the exercise of its powers, and the other, to preserve as
far as possible all available sources of revenue. The Supreme Court in its final
acceptance of the economic approach is tending toward a happy solution of
this conflict. It will now be able to apply an elastic standard whereby the fundamental powers of the governments will remain intact, and yet the revenue
departments of both governments will be freed from previously created obstacles to the imposition of their taxes with respect to large and increasing
sources of revenue.
EARL E. WASSERMAN, '38
St. Joseph, Missouri

VENDOR AND PURCHASER--RISK OF LOsS--RIGHT TO PROCEEDS OF

INSURANCE POLICY
All courts agree that the risk of loss by damage or destruction of real
property which is the subject of a specifically enforceable contract should fall
upon the one who is the owner of the property at the time the loss occurs.
Further, if the parties to such an agreement stipulate in the contract that the
property shall be in the same condition at the time named for conveyance as it
was at the time of the bargain, the risk of loss will remain on the vendor until
the time of conveyance. 1 In absence of such a stipulation, however, the courts
and writers find difficulty in determining, for this purpose, who is the owner
of the property at the time of the loss.
The rule adopted by England and a majority of the American courts is
that the loss falls on the purchaser from the time that a binding, specifically
performable contract for the sale of the real property is entered into.2 The

60.

59 Sup. Ct. 595, 598 (1939).

1. Goddard v. Bebout, 40 Ind. 114 (1872); Rhomberg v. Zapf, 201 Iowa
928, 208 N. W. 276 (1926); Hawkes v. Kehoe, 193 Mass. 419, 79 N. E. 766
(1907); Lord v. Sherer Dry Goods Co., 205 Mass. 1, 90 N. E. 1153 (1910);
Green v. Kelly 20 N. J. L. 544 (Sup. Ct. 1845); Brownell v. Board of Education,
239 N. Y. 369, 146 N. E. 630 (1925).
2. Loventhal v. Home Ins. Co., 112 Ala. 108, 20 So. 419 (1895); Roach v.
Richardson, 84 Ark. 37, 104 S. W. 538 (1907); Kaufman v. All Persons, 16 Cal.
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courts of Missouri, too, have adopted this view. This result is reached by the
application of the doctrine of equitable conversion, which doctrine, in turn, is
seemingly a result of the superior assurance afforded a purchaser in equity, by
way of specific performance, of getting the specific land for which he has contracted. To rationalize, however, the various courts have developed and adopted
theories, by which they describe the operative effect of equitable conversion,
which shifts the burden of loss from the vendor to the purchaser at the incep4
tion of the contract: first, Equity regards as done that which ought to be done;
second, the vendor is the trustee of the land for the purchaser, with the pur5
chaser owning the beneficial interest; third, the vendor holds the legal title to
the land as security for the purchase money, as in a mortgage transaction;"
fourth, in Equity, the land is considered to have been converted into the purchase money in the hands of the vendor, and the purchase money into land in
7
the hands of the purchaser.
Although the decisions are almost uniform in this country, as to result,
8
the writers disagree as to the proper basis for the rule. Professor Vanneman
believes that there should be no mechanical rule, such as is reached by the
"ownership" approach of the doctrine of equitable conversion, but that better

App. 388, 117 Pac. 586 (1911) ; Hough v. City Fire Ins. Co., 29 Conn. 10 (1860) ;
Phinizy v. Guernsey, 111 Ga. 346, 36 S. E. 796 (1900); Lombard v. Chicago
Sinai Congregation, 64 Ill. 477 (1872); Thompson v. Norton, 14 Ind. 187 (1860);
O'Brien v. Paulsen, 192 Iowa 1351, 186 N. W. 440 (1922); Marks v. Tichenor,
85 Ky. 536, 4 S. W. 225 (1887); Brewer v. Herbert, 30 Md.'301 (1869); Skinner
& Sons' Ship-Bldg. & D. D. Co. v. Houghton, 92 Md. 68, 48 Atl. 85 (1900);
Hamilton v. Dwelling House Ins. Co., 98 Mich. 535, 57 N. W. 735 (1894);
McGinley v. Forrest, 107 Neb. 309, 186 N. W. 74 (1921); Cropper v. Brown,
76 N. J. Eq. 406, 74 Atl. 987 (Ch. 1909); Sewell v. Underhill, 197 N. Y. 168,
90 N. E. 430 (1910); Sutton v. Davis, 143 N. C. 474, 55 S. E. 844 (1906); Woodward v. McCollum, 16 N. D. 42, 111 N. W. 623 (1907); Gilbert v. Port, 28 Ohio
St. 276 (1876) ; Dunn v. Yakish, 10 Okla. 388, 61 Pac. 926 (1900) ; Ins. Co. v.
Updegraff, 21 Pa. 513 (1853); Reed v. Lukens, 44 Pa. 200 (1863); Brakhage v.
Tracy, 13 S. D. 343, 83 N. W. 363 (1900); Northern Texas Realty & Const. Co.
v. Lary, 136 S. W. 843 (Tex. Civ. App. 1911); Maudru v. Humphreys, 83 W. Va.
307, 98 S. W. 259 (1919); Paine v. Meller, 6 Ves. 349 (Ch. 1801); Poole v.
Adams, 10 L. T. 287, 12 W. R. 683, 33 L. J. 639 (V. C. K. 1864).
3. Snyder v. Murdock, 51 Mo. 175 (1872); Walker v. Owen, 79 Mo. 563
(1883); Ranck v. Wickwire, 255 Mo. 42, 61, 164 S. W. 460 (1914); Moseley v.
Northwestern Nat. Ins. Co., 109 Mo. App. 464, 84 S. W. 1000 (1905); Manning
v. North Br. & Mere. Ins. Co., 123 Mo. App. 456, 99 S. W. 1095 (1907); Mahan
v. Home Ins. Co. of New ,York, 205 Mo. App. 592, 226 S. W. 593 (1920);
Standard Oil Co. v. Dye, 223 Mo. App. 926, 20 S. W. (2d) 946 (1929).
4. Lombard v. Chicago Sinai Congregation, 64 Ill. 477 (1872); McGinley v.
Forrest, 107 Neb. 309, 186 N. W. 74 (1921).
5. Phinizy v. Guernsey, 111 Ga. 346, 36 S. E. 796 (1900); Manning v.
North British & Mere. Ins. Co., 123 Mo. App. 456, 99 S. W. 1095 (1907).
6. Loventhal v. Home Ins. Co. 112 Ala. 108, 20 So. 419 (1895); McRae
v. McRae, 78 Md. 270, 27 Atl. 1038 (1893); Standard Oil Co. v. Dye, 223 Mo.
App. 926, 20 S. W. (2d) 946 (1929).
7. Skinner & Sons' Ship-Bldg. & D. D. Co. v. Houghton, 92 Md. 68, 48 Atl.
85 (1900).
8. Vanneman, Risk of Loss, in Equity, Between the Date of Contract to
Sell Real Estate and Transfer of Title (1924) 8 MINN. L. REv. 127.
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results would be obtained by adopting a contract theory. The determining
factor, he says, should be the intention of the parties, and the court, to determine this intention, should ask: At what time did the vendor intend to sell?
What did the purchaser intend to take? What would have been the reaction of
the parties if the risk of loss had been called to their intention? Vanneman
discredits the ownership theory in that all of its aspects presuppose a specifically
performable contract; and he further questions whether any such specifically
performable contract should any longer exist when the consideration bargained
for by the purchaser is totally or partially destroyed. Most of the few courts
which do not follow the majority rule employ this contract theory, and assume
an implied agreement that the property will be in the same condition at the
time for performance as it was at the time of the making of the contract.
Under this treatment of the problem, the fact that one or the other of the
parties is in possession is merely evidence of the intention of the parties to
the contract. 10
Professor Williston" submits that the risk of loss should be put on the one
who is in possession, whether it be the vendor or the purchaser. He bases his
contentions on the following reasons: first, it is better to let the loss lie where
it falls; second, the party in possession should care for the property at his own
peril; third, negligence of a vendor in possession is difficult to prove; fourth,
the difficulties involved in the application of the English rule where the vendor
has the property insured. It has also been urged that possession should determine upon whom the burden of loss should fall, by analogy to the rule in the
case of chattels.j 2 But the distinction between chattels and realty in this respect
is clear.' 8 In the first place, a contract for the sale of chattels is not ordinarily
specifically performable at the instance of the purchaser, 13a while a specifically
performable contract does afford the purchaser a superior assurance of getting
the land in equity. Secondly, from the nature of bare possession of another's
chattel, there is no inclination on the part of the possessor, from his interest to
protect the chattel from loss; whereas, with realty, the one in possession ordinarily will exercise care because of his interest in his chattels which are con-

9. Gould v. Murch, 70 Me. 288 (1879); Wells v. Calnan, 107 Mass. 514
(1871); Hawkes v. Kehoe, 193 Mass. 419, 79 N. E. 766 (1907); Wilson v. Clark,
60 N. H. 352, 353 (1880); Elmore v. Stephens-Russell Co., 88 Ore. 509, 171 Pac.
763 (1918); Good v. Jarrard, 93 S. C. 229, 76 S. E. 698 (1911); Ashford v.
Reese, 132 Wash. 649, 233 Pac. 29 (1925).
10. Good v. Jarrard, 93 S. C. 229, 76 S. E. 698 (1911).
11. Williston, The Risk of Loss After an Executory Contract of Sale in
the Common Law (1895) 9 HARv. L. Rnv. 106, 111-130; 2 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS
(1920) §§ 927-953.
12. Appleton Elec. Co. v. Rogers, 200 Wis. 331, 228 N. W. 505 (1930).
13. Pound, Progress of the Law, 1918-1919-Equity (1920) 33 HARV. L.
R v. 813, 826.
13a. Hubbard & Perry v. Home Ins. Co. of New York, 205 Mo. App. 316,
222 S. W. 886 (1920), held that the making of a contract to sell hay which had
been insured by defendant company did not work a change of interest so as to
void the policy of insurance.
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tained in the buildings. Thirdly, possession alone is not material with respect
to passing or the existence of either legal or equitable title to land. So why
should it be material to the incidents of equitable title?
There is practically no authority for the rule that the burden of loss should
fall on the one in possession, and only one case clearly bases its decision on that
point.14 This view has, however, with slight variations, been adopted by the
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, 15 Professor Williston having drafted
this particular section. This statute has been adopted in only two states.' 6
Under other theories, some place the time at which the loss shifts at the
future date of passing title, as stipulated in the agreement, 17 while others relieve the vendor of the risk of loss only when the title is actually conveyed.18
It must be observed that, as a specifically performable contract is a condition precedent to the doctrine of equitable conversion, on which the rule of
risk of loss is based, if the vendor fails in his title,' 9 or if vendor fails to perform
conditions of the agreement, 20 or if for any other reason the agreement is not
specifically enforceable at the instance of the vendor, the burden of loss does
not shift to the purchaser, but remains on the vendor.

14.

Appleton Elec. Co. v. Rogers, 200 Wis. 331, 228 N. W. 505 (1930).

15.

UNIFORMI VENDOR AND PURCHASER RISK ACT, 9 U. L. A. (Supp. 1938)

235: "Section 1. Risk of Loss. Any contract hereafter made in this State for
the purchase and sale of realty shall be interpreted as including an agreement
that the parties shall have the following rights and duties, unless the .contract
expressly provides otherwise:
"(a) If, when neither the legal title nor the possession of the subject matter
of the contract has been transferred, all or a material part thereof is destroyed
without fault of the purchaser or is taken by eminent domain, the vendor cannot
enforce the contract, and the purchaser is entitled to recover any portion of the
price that he has paid;
"(b) If, when either the legal title or the possession of the subject matter
of the contract has been transferred, all or any part thereof is destroyed without fault of the vendor or is taken by eminent domain, the purchaser is not
thereby relieved from a duty to pay the price, nor is he entitled to recover
any portion thereof that he has paid."
16. N..Y. REAL PROPERTY LAw, § 240a; S. D. Laws 1937, c. 258.
17.

LANGDELL, BRIEF SURVEY OF EQUITY JURISDICTION (2d ed. 1908) 58-65.

18. Stone, Equitable Conversion by Contract (1913) 13 CoL. TL.REV. 369,
385-387; La Chance v. Brown, 41 Cal. App. 500, 183 Pac. 216 (1919); and see
cases cited note 9, supra.
19. Phinizy v. Guernsey, 111 Ga. 346, 36 S. E. 796 (1900); Lombard v.
Chicago Sinai Congregation, 64 Ill. 477 (1872); Eppstein v. Kuhn, 225 Ill. 115,
80 N. E. 80 (1906); Calhoon v. Belden, 3 Bush 674 (Ky. 1868); Dickinson v.
Wright, 56 Mich. 42, 22 N. W. 312 (1885); Ranck v. Wickwire, -255 Mo. 42, 164
S. W. 460 (1914) ; Kinney v. Hickox, 24 Neb. 167, 38 N. W. 816 (1888) ; Violet
v. Rose, 39 Neb. 660, 58 N. W. 216 (1894); Smith v. McCluskey, 45 Barb. 610
(N. Y. 1866); Bechtel v. Dakota Nat. Bank, 35 S.D. 191, 151 N. W. 887 (1915) ;
Christian v. Cabell, 22 Gratt. 82 (Va. 1872); Corrodus v. Sharpe, 20 Beav.
56 (Ch. 1855).
20. Chappell v. McKnight, 108 Ill. 570 (1884); National Fire Ins. Co. v.
Three States Lumber Co., 217 Ill. 115, 75 N. E. 450 (1905); Nunngesser v. Hart,
122 Iowa 647, 98 N. W. 505 (1904); O'Brien v. Paulsen, 192 Iowa 1351, 186
N. W. 440 (1922); Douglas Co. v. Union Pacific Ry., 5 Kan. 615 (1870); Page
v. Loeffler, 146 La. 890, 84 So. 194 (1920); Ranck v. Wickwire, 255 Mo. 42, 164
S.W. 460 (1914).
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Incidental to the question of risk of loss, is the problem of who, as between
the vendor and purchaser, is entitled to the proceeds of a policy of insurance
taken out by the vendor, which insures him against damage to or destruction
of the property which is the subject of the contract of sale. The matter of
insurance presents no problem in those states which place the burden of loss
on the vendor. But in those jurisdictions which hold that the loss falls on the
purchaser from the time of the inception of the contract for sale, the problem
is most important, and presents some difficulty. The leading English case is
that of Rayner v. Preston.21 There it was decided that, although the risk of
loss was on the purchaser, he had no claim to the insurance money paid to the
vendor on a policy of indemnity. The decision was based on the theory that
the policy was a personal contract of indemnity between the vendor and the
insurer, and though the principles of equitable conversion placed the risk of
loss as to the property on the purchaser, no right was thereby conferred on him
as to the proceeds of the insurance policy.
A strong dissenting opinion was written in that case by Lord Justice
James, 2 2 in which he argued that the purchaser should be allowed to recover
the proceeds of the insurance policy from the vendor. As a basis for his dissent, James urged that the doctrine of equitable conversion created a trust
estate, with the vendor as trustee for the benefit of the purchaser, the equitable
owner. Following from that, it appears that any benefit which accrues to a
trustee, from whatever source or under whatever circumstances, by reason of
his legal ownership of the property, that right and that benefit he likewise
takes as trustee for the beneficial owner. Further, it was contended by James,
that the contract of insurance is not a mere collateral contract, such as a wagering agreement, but is rather a contract under which a right will arise only
when there is a loss to the land. The trustee received the insurance money
as a result, and as the actual amount, of the damage to the property. The majority opinion disallowed the trust contention, saying that the vendor was a
trustee only of the land itself, and as the insurance policy was not a part of
the property sold, the purchaser should not get the money any more than he
would the rents accruing between the time of the making of the contract, and
the time of the conveyance.
Missouri,23 and a majority of the American courts, 24 have departed from

21. 18 Ch. D. 1 (1881).
22. Ibid.
23. Standard Oil Co. v. Dye, 223 Mo. App. 926, 20 S. W. (2d) 946 (1929).
Mahan v. Home Ins. Co., 205 Mo. App. 592, 226 S. W. (1920) (dictum), denies
recovery by the vendor, insured, of the insurance money, on the ground that he
had parted with all interest. This case indicates that the purchaser would be
allowed recovery from the insurance company in this situation, and is cited by
the court in Standard Oil Co. v. Dye as so holding. Also see Manning v. North
British & Mere. Ins. Co., 123 Mo. App. 456, 99 S. W. 1095 (1907) (dictum).
24. Williams v. Lilley, 67 Conn. 50, 34 Atl. 765 (1895); Phinizy v. Guernsey,
111 Ga. 346, 36 S. E. 796 (1900); Brady v. Welsh, 200 Iowa 44, 204 N. W. 235
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the rule of Rayner v. Preston, and allow the purchaser either to recover the
proceeds received by the vendor on a policy of insurance, or to apply that
amount toward the satisfaction of the purchase price, owing from the purchaser to the vendor. Missouri, as do most of the courts, so holding, arrives
at that result by application of the trust theory advanced by James in his dissent in Rayner v. Presto25
A recent Missouri case 26 places much reliance on the frequently cited case
of Skinner & Sons' Ship-Bldg. & D. D. Co. v. Houghton.2
It was there pointed
out that, in view of the prevailing view which places the burden of loss on
the purchaser, the denial to the purchaser of the right to recover the insurance
money would be to arrive at a decision which would be most unjust. Where the
loss falls on the purchaser, the vendor will receive as purchase money the full
compensation for which he contracted to part with the property, and to allow him,
the vendor, also to receive the insurance money would be to unjustly enrich him
to that amount. Also, in such a case, the insurance company should be able
to refuse payment to the vendor, he having suffered no loss from which indemnity may be required. 28 The conclusion reached, then, in Rayner V. Preston, would place the full loss on the purchaser, denying him the full consideration for which he had contracted, and at the same time, would relieve the insurance company from a risk which it contracted to assume, and for which it
had received premiums in compensation therefor.
Williston, 29 in referring to the prevailing view placing the risk of loss on
the purchaser, says that to allow the purchaser to recover the insurance money
is to sacrifice the fundamental principles of insurance law, in an attempt to
correct the operation of one bad rule by another. However true that may be,
it is submitted, in view of the fact that the law in most jurisdictions does place
the risk on the purchaser,30 that however inconsistent with other equitable
principles it may be to allow the purchaser to receive the insurance money, the
result reached is certainly more equitable, and operates with less hardship than
31
would a contrary rule.

(1925); Mattingly v. Springfield Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 120 Ky. 768, 83 S. W.
577 (1904); Skinner & Sons' Ship-Bldg. & D. D. Co. v. Houghton, 92 Md. 68,
48 Atl. 85 (1900); Standard Oil Co. v. Dye, 223 Mo. App. 926, 20 S. W. (2d)
946 (1929); McGinley v. Forrest, 107 Neb. 309, 186 N. W. 74 (1921)'; Millville
Aerie, No. 1836, F. 0. E. v. Weatherby, 82 N. J. Eq. 455, 88 AtI. 847 (Ch. 1913);
Peck v. Hale, 11 Ohio App. 418 (1919); Gilbert v. Port, 28 Ohio St. 276 (1876);
Ins. Co. v. Updegraff, 21 Pa. 513 (1853); Reed v. Lukens, 44 Pa. 200 (1863);
Brakhage v. Tracy, 13 S. D. 343, 83 N. W. 363 (1900).
25. 18 Ch. D. 1 (1881).
26. Standard Oil Co. v. Dye, 223 Mo. App. 926, 20 S. W. (2d) 946 (1929).
27. 92 Md. 68, 48 Atl. 85 (1900).
28. Aetna Fire Ins. Co. v. Tyler, 16 Wend. 385, 397 (N. Y. 1836);
Castellain v. Preston, 11 Q. B. D. 380 (1883). See Mahan v. Home Ins. Co.,
205 Mo. App. 592, 226 S. W. 593 (1920). See, also, cases cited, note 31, infra.
29. 2 WIL-STON, CONTRACTS (1920) § 942.
30. See cases cited, note 1, supra.
31. Nor can it be said that these decisions operate as a hardship on the
insurance companies. For, to a great extent, such a situation as this is gen-
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Vance3 2 points out that business usage substitutes the insurance money
for the property, despite the rule that the two are not legally connected, and
urges that this meaning of the transaction in the market place should also
be its meaning in the court room. Pound33 assails that contention, arguing that
the insurance money is certainly not a part of the res bargained for, hence no
trust relation may exist in regard to it. He also discredits the theory that the
vendor is the trustee of the insurance money for the benefit of the purchaser,
on the basis that in most cases the insurance is carried in the name of the
vendor, individually, while a trustee, under established insurance law, has no
insurable interest. This reasoning seems to lose sight, however, of the fact
that the adoption of the trust theory by the courts is merely an attempt to
rationalize the effect, in equity, of the existence of a specifically performable
contract, and the consequent operation of the doctrine of equitable conversion.
A minority of the American courts deny to the purchaser the right to recover the insurance money, refusing to adopt the theory that the vendor is the
trustee, for this purpose, of the property for the benefit of the purchaser.3' Most
of these cases base their decisions on the view of Rayner v. Preston,3 that
the contract of insurance is a collateral and personal contract, and operates
only by way of indemnity to the vendor individually, and is not to be regarded,
for this purpose, either as the property itself, or as being, in any way, connected therewith.
It is interesting to note that the English Parliament, heeding the inequitable results reached by the application of the rule adopted by the English
courts, has enacted a statute which changes the rule completely, making all insurance money payable, in such a case, to the purchaser, to the extent to which
the loss falls on him.386

erally provided for in insurance policies. Such policies contain a clause which
provides the entire policy shall be void if any changes other than death of the
insured take place in the interest, title, or possession of the subject of the insurance, whether by process or judgment, or by voluntary acts of the insured, or
otherwise. The courts have almost universally held that a contract to sell land
works such a change of interest in the property as to make these clauses applicable. So the insurance companies may easily avail themselves of the protection, to which they have a right, of knowing by whose hands the insured
property is controlled. Moseley v. Northwestern Nat. Ins. Co., 109 Mo. App.
464, 84 S. W. 1000 (1905); Manning v. North British & Mere. Ins. Co., 123 Mo.
App. 456, 99 S. W. 1095 (1907); Skinner & Sons' Ship-Bldg. & D. D. Ins. Co.
v. Houghton, 92 Md. 68, 48 Atl. 85 (1900).
32. Comment (1924) 34 YALE L. J. 87, 88-91.
33. Pound, Progress of the Law, 1918-1919-Equity (1920) 33 HARV. L.
REv. 813, 829.
34. White v. Gilman, 138 Cal. 375, 71 Pac. 436 (1903); Zenor v. Hayes,
228 Ill. 626, 81 N. E. 1144 (1907); King v. Preston, 11 La. Ann. 95 (1856);
Marion v. Wolcott, 68 N. J. Eq. 20, 59 Atl. 242 (Ch. 1904); Brownell v. Board
of Education, 239 N. Y. 369, 146 N. E. 630 (1925).
35. 18 Ch. D. 1 (1881).
36. LAW or PRoPERTY ACT, 12 & 13 GEO. V, C. 16, § 105 (1922); LAW or
PRoPERTY ACT, 15 GEo. V, c. 20, § 47 (1925).

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1939

19

1939]

Missouri
Law Review, Vol. 4, Iss. 3 [1939], Art. 3
COMMENTS

Difficulty is encountered in those jurisdictions in which the risk of loss
is held to fall on the purchaser, in those cases where the purchaser holds, instead of an executory contract for sale, an unexercised option for the purchase of the real property. Where the option has been exercised prior to the
time the loss occurs, it is clear that the loss falls upon the purchaser, there
being a specifically enforceable contract, which gives rise to the doctrine of
equitable conversion and its attendant consequences.3 7 In those cases, however, in which the option is unexercised at the time of the loss, but the optionee
attempts to exercise the option subsequent to the loss, with the purpose in mind
of applying to the price the amount of insurance money paid or owing to the
optionor, the courts have been somewhat troubled. The usual contention of the
optionee in such a case is that the exercise of the option causes the entire transaction to relate back to the time of the inception of the option contract, and
thus operate as a binding contract of sale from that time. This argument is
based on an analogy to the rule, which is the weight of authority in England
and in this country, that is applicable to those cases in which the optionor dies,
and thereafter the option is exercised by the optionee. In such cases, the weight
of authority seems to be that the purchase money goes to the next of kin as
personalty, the courts holding that the contract relates back to the time of the
giving of the option, equitable conversion either taking place at, or relating
back to, that time.38 In England and a great majority of the American courts,
however, no weight is given to this contention in the insurance proceeds cases,
and the optionee is given no right to the insurance money.3 9 In the leading
English case of Edwards v. West,40 recovery was denied an optionee who had
exercised the option subsequent to a fire, on the ground that equitable conversion applies only when the option is exercised, and cannot relate back to an
earlier date. In that case, Justice Fry refused to extend the relation back
theory, which applies in case of the death of the optionor, to such a case as
this. The decision was based on the theory that a specifically enforceable contract did not exist until the option was exercised. When there is a contract
capable of being specifically enforced, the property comprised in that contract
is deemed to belong to the purchaser, and the purchase money is deemed to belong
to the vendor, both as of the date of that contract-neither earlier nor laterbecause those two things ought to be done. But there is no obligation to have

37. Standard Oil Co. v. Dye, 223 Mo. App. 926, 20 S. W. (2d) 946 (1929).
38. Haughwout v. Murphy, 22 N. J. Eq. 531 (1871); Kerr v. Day, 14 Pa.
112 (1850); Siter, James & Co.'s Appeal, 26 Pa. 178 (1856); Newport Water
Works v. Sisson, 18 R. I. 411, 28 Atl. 336 (1893); Farrar v. Winterton, 5 Bear.
1 (Ch. 1842). Contra: Inghram v. Chandler, 179 Iowa 304, 161 N. W. 434
(1917); Smith v. Loewenstein, 50 Ohio St. 346 (1893).
39. Caldwell v. Frazier, 65 Kan. 24, 68 Pac. 1076 (1902); Boston & Me.
R. R. v. Bartlett, 3 Cush. 224 (Mass. 1849); Gamble v. Garlock, 116 Minn. 59,
133 N. W. 175 (1911); Trumbull v. Bombard, 171 App. Div. 700, 157 N. Y.
Supp. 794 (3d Dep't 1916); Gilbert v. Port, 20 Ohio St. 276 (1876); Newton v.
Newton, 11 R. I. 390 (1876); JAMES, OPTION CONTRACTS (1916) § 512.
40. 7 Ch. D. 858 (1878).
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them done at an earlier date than that of the contract which is constituted and
created by the exercise of the option. The conversion cannot, according to
principle, relate back to an earlier date than that of the contract which gives
rise to it.
So, clearly, the loss is on the optionor, there being no specifically performable contract from the date of which the equitable conversion might operate.
The loss being on the optionor, the optionee has no interest in, nor claim to,
the insurance money received by or due to the optionor. After the loss, however, the optionee may exercise the option, accepting the terms of the option
contract as they existed before the loss, and pay the full purchase price stipulated in the contract. It is for him to determine if the bargain, in view of the
loss, is still worth his while.
A few American jurisdictions, however, allow the optionee to exercise the
option to buy subsequent to the loss, and then have the amount of the insurance
money received by the optionor applied on the purchase price.41 The courts
arriving at such a conclusion base their decisions on the theory that the contract relates back to the time of the giving of the option. Under such reasoning, there is a specifically enforceable contract at the time the loss occurs, which
puts the risk of loss on the optionee if he exercises his option. Hence, under
the general doctrine of equitable conversion, the optionee is entitled to the proceeds of the insurance received by, or due to, the optionor. This principle never
operates at a hardship on the optionee, as it is his right either to exercise or
leave the option, whichever is more profitable to him. It seems difficult to follow the reasoning of these cases, whether they with situations in which the
optionor has died or in which a loss has occurred. The better doctrine, both in
principle and authority, would seem to be that which denies to the optionee
any right of recovery as to the insurance money in these cases where the
loss has occurred prior to the exercise of the option.
Of course, in neither the contract nor the option cases will the question of
the right to the insurance proceeds ever arise in the forms herein considered
if the policy contains a provision voiding it in the event of a change of interest or one making the proceeds payable to the vendor and purchaser as their
interests appear, or as the loss appears. Under the first possibility the insurance company, by the terms of the policy, is discharged from liability by virtue of the change of interest resulting from the contract between the vendor
and the purchaser,42 while under the second the disposition of the proceeds of
the effective insurance policy has been contracted for. Likewise the risk of
loss may be placed by the contract. 43 An alert and competent lawyer, representing either the vendor or purchaser, can and should easily anticipate and

41. Williams v. Lilley, 67 Conn. 50, 34 Atl. 765 (1895); Peoples Street Ry.
v. Spencer, 156 Pa. 85, 27 Atl. 113 (1893).
42. See cases cited note 31, supra.
43. See cases cited note 1, supra.
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avoid all the difficulties noted herein by the simple devices of providing for all of
the mentioned contingencies in the contract of sale and by notifying the interested insurance company in advance of the contemplated change of interest,
so that its consent to the change may be obtained.
THOMAS E. DEAcY, JR.

CONFLICT OF LAWS AS TO PRESUMPTIONS AND BURDEN OF PROOF

It is generally said that whatever law may determine the substantive
rights of litigants, the procedure of the trial must follow the rules of the
forum.1 The merit of the conception here expressed is obvious. Not only is
it appropriate for the courts which as a branch of a sovereign government
protect the rights and enforce the obligations of the parties before them to act
in their own manner, but it would be highly inconvenient for them to adopt the
procedure of other tribunals. 2 The field of adjective law is one of great intricacy and nicety and few men master more than one system. On the other
hand it is to-day quite universally conceded that the choice of the forum should
3
Depending upon the basic theory
not determine the result of the litigation.
be
said that there should be uniform
it
may
is
adopted,
of conflict of laws which
enforcement of the rights created by the law in force where the facts of the
controversy occurred, or that it is desirable that all forums regard the fact
of the same foreign law as the decisive element in the case. But even with
these objectives in mind the application of the rule is not as elear as might be
desired and too often it is obscured by simple faith in the efficacy of its state4

ment in terms of "substance" and "procedure".
It has been shown that the distinction between

"substance" and "pro-

cedure" was first attempted in cases interpreting the language of the Statute
5
Problems of
of Frauds-i. e. was the obligation void or merely unenforceable.
not
surprising
It
is
recently.
fairly
until
recognized
choice of law were not
that concepts already developed should have been utilized in solving the new
questions, despite the quite different function to be performed. Furthermore, the
trend of the common law toward exclusiveness-considered by civil law lawyers

1. 3 BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1935) § 595; GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF
LAWS (1927) § 84; RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934) § 595; STUMBERG,
CONFLICT OF LAwS (1937) c. 6; Note (1932) 78 A. L. R. 883.
2. Cook, "Substance" and "Procedure" in the Conflict of Laws (1933) 42
YALE L. J. 333.
3. Note (1932) 80 U. of PA. L. REv. 911.
4. McClintock, Distinguishing Substance and Procedure in the Conflict of
Laws (1930) 78 U. OF PA. L. REv. 933; Cook, loc. cit. supra note 2.
5. Lorenzen, The Statute of Frauds and the Conflict of Laws (1923) 32
YALE L. J. 311.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol4/iss3/3

22

et al.: Comments
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 4

to be founded upon the provincialism of a small, unified island nation-worked
through this doctrine to limit the effect of the foreign law by enlargement of
the concept of procedure. The influence of an industrial civilization, plus the
important consideration that conflict of laws problems in the United States, at
least, most commonly involve merely the laws of sister states and not those of
a foreign country based on a foreign system of laws, has led to the rationalization
of the rule suggested above and to a consequent desire to restrict the definition
of procedure.
Professor Stumberg writes, "
from the point of view of Conflict of
Laws, procedural rules are those which concern methods of presenting to a court
the operative facts upon which legal relations depend; substantive rules, those
which concern the legal effect of those facts after they have been established."0
Under definitions essentially in accord with this, the clear weight of authority
has regarded the issues of burden of proof and the existence, character, and
effect of presumptions to be drawn from the evidence to be matters of procedure.7 A distinction is commonly drawn between "conclusive presumptions,"
which are said to be rules of substantive law,8 and all others, which, though
clearly varying in nature and effect, are treated alike in questions of conflict
of laws. If the problem cannot be solved by simple reliance on the arbitrary
use of the words "substance" and "procedure" it would seem further analysis is
desirable.
Presumptions are most commonly classified according to the effect they
have upon the litigation. Thus, a given presumption may be simply legal authorization for a conclusion depending upon proved facts. In practice this
tends to be presented in such questions as whether the evidence is sufficient to
"iake the case to the jury" or "to uphold the verdict". Or the presumption may
be regarded as inevitably leading to the conclusion from the proved facts in
the absence of contradictory proof. Further, there is difference of opinion as
to the effect of the presumption after the rebutting evidence has been received.
Whert explanation has been offered, is there any longer room for an inference
which might otherwise reasonably bridge the gap from basic fact to conclusion?
If it still retains evidentiary value, is it sufficient to shift the burden of proof
by a preponderance of the evidence to the rebutting litigant? And finally,
the "presumption" may be conclusive, which means that in the instant case the
true fact is immaterial and that as a matter of policy liability or non-liability
follows.
A different classification on the basis of "logic" and "policy" has been
suggested, a classification which runs across the one above. Professor Chafee

6. STUMBERG, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1937) 128.
7. 3 BEALE, CONFLICT oF LAWS (1935) §§ 595.2, 595.3; GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1927) § 84; RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934) § 595;
STUMBERG, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1937) 131; Note (1932) 78 A. L. R. 883.
8. Note (1918) 18 CoL. L. REv. 354; RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS
(1934) § 595, comment c.
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illustrates9 with instances of the presumption that a letter mailed has been
received (a presumption based upon experience and demonstrable probabilities)
and the presumption that if goods are handled in transit, by several carriers,
any damage was caused by the conduct of the last carrier (a rule of convenience
which cannot be shown to correlate with observation). The Supreme Court
of New Hampshire expressed this approach when, in Precourt v. Driscoll,'0 it
held that the Vermont rule placing on the plaintiff the burden of pleading freedom from contributory negligence should be applied to a cause of action arising
from facts occurring in Vermont. "Neither legislation nor judicial rule may
convert conjectures into rational inferences, or give to presumptions which they
establish the character and quality of evidence." It was felt that the burden
of affirmatively proving or disproving contributory negligence affected more
than "the orderly presentation of evidence"; it was "incorporated with the substantive law" of Vermont requiring negligence in the defendant and care in
the plaintiff. The court pertinently observed that the difficulty was not obviated
by the fact that the rule as to burden of proof simply had the effect of a presumption which could be overcome by the introduction of evidence. If the evidence were not introduced the contrary New Hampshire rule contended for
would have the effect of canceling from the case the element of the plaintiff's
care, essential by Vermont law. "The presumption is no more a rational inference than a conclusion that evidence of the plaintiff's care shows the defendant's negligence, or even that a cause of action is probably good because
suit has been brought."
There is much to be said for the proposition that a presumption which has
no "core of reason," if in force at the "place of wrong," should be applied by
the foreign forum in which the tort action is tried. Conversely, if it is but a
logical inference, founded on experience, the forum should be free to depend
on its experience in according the inference such weight as-was there customary.
The analysis has practical defects, however. To the extent that the inference
is concededly reasonable, there is not likely to be any conflicts question. But
if there is room for doubt, who is to determine whether a presumption is logical
or arbitrary? It would seem that it must ultimately be the forum deciding the
question as one of "qualification," but it is fairly certain that presumptions
and burdens of proof differing from those applied by the forum to its domestic
controversies are not likely to be regarded as based upon sound probabilities of
fact. In most cases, then, the suggested rule would lead to the application of the
foreign law. This may be desirable. The forum need take cognizance of the
foreign presumption only when pleaded (and in most jurisdictions, proved),"3

9. Chafee, The Progress of the Law, 1919-1921: Evidence (1922) 35
HARv. L. Rnv. 302
10. 85 N. H. 280, 157 Atl. 525 (1931), 78 A. L. R. 874 (1932), noted in
(1932) 16 MINN. L. REv. 586, and (1932) 80 U. OF PA. L. REv. 911.
11. STUMBERG, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1937) 157. Cf. Mo. REv. STAT. (1929)

§ 806.
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and it should not be very inconvenient to apply it. Granted that one who seeks
relief from the tribunal of any state must prove his facts to the satisfaction of
that tribunal and no other, there is considerable danger that difference in presumptions may in actual practice lead to a difference in result apart from the
12
weight of the evidence actually introduced.
According to the Restatement of Conflict of Laws, the law of the forum.
should govern presumptions and inferences to be drawn from evidence and all
matters falling within the description "burden of proof". It is said that a
different situation exists where by the law of the place of wrong (using a tort
case for purposes of illustration) proof of freedom from contributory negligence
is regarded as a condition of the cause of action itself.' 3 Presumably the decision in Precourt v. Driscoll would be reconciled under this principle. The
exception seems too difficult to use; the reasoning of the New Hampshire court
suggests the inevitability of integration between the rule of presumption and
the cause of action. The exception may be a concession to the reporter's con14
cern over the validity of the general rule.
The Missouri decisions present an interesting study in judicial uncertainty.
A number of opinions voice the general rule of substance and procedure, but
the first case to raise the issue here discussed was Hiatt v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry.,15 an action arising from a grade crossing accident in Arkansas. Statutes of that state provided that anyone there operating a railroad should be
liable for the damage so caused; i. e., should be liable for damage resulting
from failure to maintain a lookout in the operation of the trains and that the
burden of proving the maintenance of the lookout should be on the operators
of the railroad,"6 and that contributory negligence should not be a defense by
the railroad unless it exceeded in degree that of the railroad but should only
diminish the amount recovered. 17 It was thought that these statutes had been
construed by the Supreme Court of Arkansas to raise a presumption of negligence on the part of the railroad which it would have to rebut by a preponderance of the evidence. The Supreme Court of Missouri held that such a presumption changed the substantive law and was properly applied to the trial
in the latter state. This decision was approved and followed in Ramey v. Missouri Pacific R. R.18
It is apparent that the presumption has no "core of reason". Indeed, un-

12. This point is well illustrated in Cook, op. cit. supra note 2, at 353ff.
13. RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934) § 595, comment a. Cf. Southern Ry. v. Robertson, 7 Ga. App. 154, 66 S. E. 535 (1909). See also STUaIBERG, CONFLICT OF LAWS

(1937) 133.

14. 3 BEALE, CoNFLuCT OF LAWS (1935) § 595.3.
For a case holding according to
15. 308 Mo. 77, 271 S. W. 806 (1925).
the generally accepted view, see Jones v. Chicago, St. P., M. & 0. Ry., 80 Minn.
488, 83 N. W. 446 (1900).
16. ARK. DIG. STAT. (Crawford & Moses, 1921) § 8568.
17. Id. at § 8575.
18. 323 Mo. 662, 21 S. W. (2d) 873 (1929).
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less some justification of public interest in and control over the operation of
railroads can be advanced for it, its application is probably an unconstitutional
(As interpreted, this presumption
deprivation of the railroad's property.
was given the weight of evidence even after contradicting evidence had been
presented.) Whatever the policy which dictated it, the presumption clearly
does more than order the presentation of evidence.
In Menard v. Goltra,'9 the cause of action was one for wrongful death in
Illinois. By the law of that state the plaintiff in all tort actions must prove the
negligence of the defendant and the exercise of his own care. By the law of
Missouri contributory negligence is an affirmative defense to be pleaded and
proved. From the standpoint of conflict of laws the case was very inadequately tried by the defendant, who failed to plead the Illinois law both as to burden of
proof and as to the humanitarian doctrine (which has been held to be a substantive question). 20 The court held that the Missouri rule of pleading and
proving contributory negligence was properly followed, both because of failure
to introduce the Illinois law and because it related "merely to matters of procedure." The law of the forum "controls as to the burden of proof, the competency of the witnesses and the weight of the evidence." The Hiatt case was
not cited by counsel or court. The Ramey case was cited only in connection
with the question of sufficient pleading of the foreign law.
In the Missouri Annotations to the Restatement of Conflict of Laws the question is pertinently asked, 21 would it have made any difference if, by the law of
Illinois, proof of care by the plaintiff was regarded as a condition precedent to
action? Conceivably, on this ground Precourt v. Driscoll could be distinguished,
but it seems clear that the distinction was not in the minds of either court.
Piecourt v. Driscoll considered the issue of burden of proof to be a phase of the
broader question of presumptions, pointing out that in effect the New Hampshire
rule on contributory negligence (which was the same as that in Missouri) operated as a rebuttable presumption of due care, in which the presumption had
the effect of evidence. The soundness of this observation precludes satisfactory
distinction from the Hiatt and Ramey decisions. In the former much emphasis
was laid upon the statutory foundation of the Arkansas law, but while it may
emphasize the close relation between a statute of admittedly substantive law
and a judicial interpretation thereof in terms of presumptions, there is no correlation between substance and procedure and statute and common law.
In 1931, the Springfield Court of Appeals wrestled with a different phase
of our problem in Jackson v. St. Louis-San Francisco R. R.22 A grade crossing
accident had occurred in Oklahoma, whose constitution provides, 23 "The defense

19. 328 Mo. 368, 40 S. W. (2d) 1053 (1931).
20. Johnson v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry., 290 S. W. 462 (Mo. App. 1927);
Cox v. Terminal R. R. Ass'n of St. L., 43 S. W. (2d) 571 (Mo. App. 1931).
21. RESTATEmENT, CONFLICT Op LAws, Mo. ANNOT. (1937) § 595.
22. 224 Mo. App. 601, 31 S. W. (2d) 250 (1930).
23. OKLA. CONST. art. III, § 6.
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of contributory negligence or assumption of risk shall, in all cases whatsoever,
be a question of fact, and shall at all times be left to the jury." On the authority of Hiatt v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. and Ramey v. Missouri Pacifio
Ry., it was held error to strike the plea of this law in the Missouri trial. This
is a harder case. What Oklahoma had undertaken to do was to designate the
tribunal which should determine essential issues in the litigation. One who
brings his action in Missouri must submit his case to the triers of fact it designates. It is true that in many cases the rule will have the same effect as a
presumption of due care. As previously stated, the presumption issue is frequently presented in questions of the sufficiency of the evidence to carry the
case to the jury. The result is not inevitably the same, however.
The Oklahoma constitutional provision had been held not to violate the
Constitution of the United States, the Federal Supreme Court observing2 4 that
"the plaintiff in error cannot complain that its chance to prevail upon a certain
ground is diminished when the ground might have been altogether removed."
The Missouri court seized upon this as an expression of opinion that it was
but a variation of the same theme to remove contributory negligence as a defense and to provide that it should be tried by a jury. As a matter of constitutional law it may be; as a matter of conflict of laws, it may not. It is not
improbable that the people of Oklahoma hoped by this provision to increase the
probability of recovery in tort actions, 25 but it is not for that reason binding
upon sister states. The same sentiment might induce legislation disqualifying
from jury service in tort actions all persons who had ever defended similar
suits. It would hardly be contended that such legislation would be given extraterritorial consideration.
In this connection it might be profitable to digress a little way. The distinction between negligence as a matter of law, and negligence as a mixed issue
of law and fact, is nearly as illusive as that between substance and procedure.
The traditional approach may be stated as follows: Assuming that the place
of alleged wrong is the place of both conduct and resulting injury, where the
place of wrong determines resulting liability only by the application of a standard of conduct (i. e., that of a reasonably prudent man) to the particular facts,
a foreign forum will apply that standard to those facts in its own way, indifferent to the result which might have been obtained if the action had been tried
in the place of wrong. 20 But if, by the law of the place of wrong, men might

24. Chicago, R. I. & Pac. Ry. v. Cole, 251 U. S. 54 (1919).
25. Note (1931) 31 CoL. L. Rav. 158.
26. RESTATEmENT, CONFLCT OF LAWS (1934) § 595, comment b. Missouri
cases: Teitsort v. Illinois Cent. R. R., 322 Mo. 640, 15 S. W. (2d) 779 (1929);
Sing v. St. Louis-S. F. Ry., 30 S. W. (2d) 37 (Mo. 1930); Connole v. East St.
Louis & S. Ry., 340 Mo. 690, 102 S. W. (2d) 581 (1937); Morris v. Chicago,
R. I. & P. Ry., 251 S. W. 763 (Mo. App. 1923); Johnson v. Atchison, T. & S.
F. Ry., 290 S. W. 462 (Mo. App. 1927); Cox v. Terminal R. R. Ass'n of St.
L., 43 S. W. (2d) 571 (Mo. App. 1931), aff'd, 331 Mo. 910, 55 S. W. (2d) 685
(1932); Boneau v. Swift & Co., 66 S. W. (2d) 172 (Mo. App. 1934).
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not differ as to the inevitable result of applying that standard to those facts
(i. e., negligence or due care as a matter of law) the foreign forum will accept that determination. 27 It is seldom that the issue is squarely presented.
Decisions of the place of "wrong" that the specific conduct was tortious in law
are usually followed elsewhere, 28 but if the question is left to the jury it is almost impossible to know whether weight has been given the foreign view or
not. Occasionally there are available from the place of "wrong" decisions that
the given conduct cannot as a matter of law be considered negligent or careful.
In Morris v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Ry.,29 it was held that under those
circumstances it was error to direct a verdict in a foreign trial. This would
seem to be in accord with the Jackson case, 29 ' and it would seem open to the
same criticism. It should still be open to the state in which the action is brought
to determine for itself what tribunal, judge or jury, should determine whether
the facts met the standard. While authority requires that the conclusion of the
place of "wrong" that reasonable men could not differ should be respected elsewhere, the determination lays down a rule of positive law as to specific conduct. A conclusion that reasonable men might differ does not; the only law
in force is the basic standard, which is applied to the facts of the case.
It is interesting to note that the precise problem of the Jackson case was
recently presented in Arkansas.30 The supreme court of that state also held
that the Oklahoma constitution should control.
Despite the inconsistency of Menard v. Goltra, there has been no intimation
that the Hiatt and Ramey cases are not still good law. In Oxford V. St. LouisSan Francisco Ry.31 and Kirkdoffer v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry.,3 2 the Arkansas presumptions were again before the supreme court. In both cases the
trial courts had so instructed the jury that the railroad was presumptively
negligent that the presumption was given the weight of evidence. On the
ground that since the Hiatt and Ramey decisions the Arkansas court had changed
its interpretation of its own statute, both cases were reversed. There was no intimation that the present Arkansas rule should not be followed. On the contrary, there was every indication that the rebuttable presumption which merely
put on the railroad the burden of coming forward with evidence, and which
was of no effect when evidence of care had been introduced, should be applied.
A somewhat analogous problem was presented in Hartmann v. Louisville &

§ 595, comment b.

27.

RESTATMIENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934)

28.

RESTATEMIENT, CONFLICT OF LAws (1934) § 380.

29.
29a.
30.
31.
32.

251
224
Mo.
331
327

Missouri

cases: Newlin v. St. Louis & S. F. R. R., 222 Mo. 375, 121 S.W, 125 (1909);
Gersman v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry., 229 S. W. 167 (Mo. 1921); Sing v. St.
Louis-S. F. Ry., 30 S. W. (2d) 37 (Mo. 1930); Rahm v. Chicago, R. I. &4 P.
Ry., 129 Mo. App. 679, 108 S. W. 570 (1908); Hill v. Illinois Terminal Co.,
100 S.W. (2d) 40 (Mo. App. 1937).
S.W. 763 (Mo. App. 1923).
Mo. App. 601, 31 S.W. (2d) 250 (1930).
Pac. R. R. v. Holmes, 124 S. W. .(2d) 14 (Ark. 1939).
Mo. 53, 52 S.W. (2d) 983 (1932).
Mo. 166, 37 S. W. (2d) 569 (1931).
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Nashville R. R., 33 where a bill of lading limiting the liability of defendant carrier had been issued to the plaintiff in Illinois. By the law of that state the
mere receipt of the bill did not destroy the possible cause of action against the
carrier for injury to the goods shipped. It would have been a defense by the
law of Missouri. 34 Having decided that the question was one of the contract
between the parties, and that the law of Illinois as lex loci contractu should determine the substantive rights, the court held, in accordance with the weight
of authority, that the Illinois rule was one of substantive law in that it determined what constituted an acceptance of this type of offer. A different result was reached in Massachusetts,35 where the court regarded the contractual
law of the states as the same and thought the issue was as to the inference
of assent to be drawn from receipt and retention of the bill. This view has
been adopted by the Restatement.3 6
Could reliance have been had upon Illinois interpretation of its own law
on this point? Can reference ever be made to the law of the state whose concededly substantive law is to be followed for decision on the substantive or
procedural character of its presumptions, burdens, and inferences? Despite
the intimations of the Restatement, it does not seem possible. The question is
one of qualification; 37 having decided that the forum shall determine procedural
matters, there is no point in looking to the foreign law unless the forum has
already determined that the rule at issue is substantive. Furthermore, such reference is likely to involve the forum in the endless circle of renvoi. The forum
must classify legal principles according to its own concepts and to its own convenience.
JOHN P. HAMSHAW

REQUIREMENT OF "MUTUALITY" IN CONTRACTS--ACTIONS AT LAW
Suppose that S and B enter into a contract whereby S agrees to sell and B
agrees to buy all of the potatoes raised by S on his land during a specified time.
Is such a contract "unilateral," and void for want of "mutuality?" In the
case of Edwards v. Offut,' a Missouri appellate court employed language which
would cast doubt upon the validity of such an agreement. On the other hand,

33. 39 Mo. App. 88 (1890).
34. Id. at 89, 90.
35. Hoadley v. Northern Transportation Co., 115 Mass. 304 (1874).
36. RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934) § 595, illustration 4.
37. For an interesting and acute summary of the several theories of the
doctrine of "qualification" or "characterization", see Robertson, A Survey of
the CharacterizationProblem in the Conflict of Laws (1939) 52 HARV. L. REv.
747.
1. 229 Mo. App. 496, 78 S.W. (2d) 140 (1934).
the subject of this discussion.

The decision itself is not
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when one Saito of Hawaii contracted with a pineapple company of that
territory to sell to it "all the merchantable smooth cayenne pineapples" that
he might grow, the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in construing the contract to obligate Saito as to sales from certain of
his holdings but not others, apparently felt no hesitation on this score l a Such
a difference of opinion merits investigation.
It is said that "unilateral contracts mean contracts that lack mutuality." 2
What then is the meaning of the term "mutuality" as applied to bilateral contracts in actions at law? That good and sufficient consideration must be furnished by each of the promisors admits of no doubt, and in this sense, at least,
there must be mutuality. But mutuality is used in another setting. It is sometimes said that there must be mutuality of obligation. It is the employment of
this phrase which leads to much confusion at least in the language of the reported cases, for it may be employed to express the aforedescribed necessity
for consideration on each side,3 or it may be intended to express the thought
4
that in a bilateral contract both promises must be binding or neither is binding.
This is true of the language of the Missouri cases, and it is not always clear
in which sense it is used,5 some cases even going so far as to use it in both

la. Hawaiian Pineapple Co. v. Saito, 270 Fed. 749 (C. C. A. 9th, 1921)
(suit in equity).
2. Laclede Const. Co. v. Tudor Iron Works, 169 Mo. 137, 151, 69 S. W.
384, 388 (1902). The generally accepted present-day use of "unilateral" contract, however, is a contract in which only one party promises performance,
the consideration being actually given by the promisee, and being something
other than a promise. A bilateral contract, on the other hand, is one where
each party promises some performance. For a more complete discussion of the
usage of "bilateral" and "unilateral," see 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (rev. ed.
1936) § 13.
3. Id. at § 141; Note (1928) 3 ST. JOHN'S L. Rnv. 120.
4. 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 103E. For a collection of articles on other
meanings given to the word, see id. at § 141, n. 4. As to the use of the term in
equity, see 5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1433. For a further discussion of various
uses of the term, see Patterson, "Illusory" Promises and Promisors' Options
(1921) 6 IowA L. BuLL. 129, 209; SELECTED READINGS ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS
(Ass'n of Am. Law Schools, 1931) 401.
5. Laclede Const. Co. v. Tudor Iron Works, 169 Mo. 137, 69 S. W. 384
(1902) (where it was said: "Mutuality of contracts means that an obligation
must rest upon each party to do or permit to be done something in consideration of the act or promise of the other. . . ."); Underwood Typewriter Co. v.
Century Realty Co., 220 Mo. 522, 119 S. W. 400 (1909) (saying: "But mutuality,
in its essence, is but a phase, strictly speaking, of the consideration that will
support a contract."); Hudson v. Browning, 264 Mo. 58, 174 S. W. 393 (1915)
(where it was said in effect that the contract was void because there was no
mutuality of agreement such as made one promise a consideration for the other);
Martin v. Ray County Coal Co., 288 Mo. 241, 232 S. W. 149 (1921) (where
it was said: ". . . the contract pleaded was not lacking in either consideration or mutuality."); Gillen v. Bayfield, 329 Mo. 681, 46 S. W. (2d)
571 (1932) (where the court in quoting from 13 C. J. 237 enumerates among
other things as essential elements of a contract, legal consideration, mutuality
of agreement, and mutuality of obligation); Eaton v. The Wear Coal Co., 125
Mo. App. 194, 101 S. W. 1140 (1907); Dickson v. Eames, 134 Mo. App. 373,
114 S. W. 574 (1908); Hirsch & Sons Iron & Rail Co. v. Paragould and M. R.
R., 148 Mo. App. 173, 127 S. W. 623 (1910); Warren v. Ray County Coal Co.,
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senses in the same opinion.5a The validity of the phrase as used in the latter
sense seems more questionable. The cases in which only one of the promises is
binding and enforceable are so numerous and varied that it may well be, and
has been, argued that the rule, if there is such a rule, has been eaten up by
its exceptions. 6 Whether, however, mutuality of obligation means only mutuality of consideration, or mutuality of binding promises, the crucial question remains one of consideration, since, as has been pointed out, the statement that
both promises must be binding or neither is binding itself involves no other
element than that of consideration.7 It is the purpose here to analyze the type
situation presented at the outset hereof for the presence or absence of consideration.
Looking now to the case under discussion, was there in fact sufficient consideration to support the mutual promises made? The most generally accepted
idea of consideration at the present time is that it is the "exchange or price
requested and received by the promisor for the promise". 8 In general, consideration need only circumscribe one's freedom of action, and neither the benefit
to the promisor nor the detriment to the promisee need be actual, in the economic sense, as distinguished from legal. This was expressed in Missouri as
early as 1843, when the supreme court said in Marks v. Bank of Missouriu "It
is unnecessary that the consideration should be adequate in point of actual
value, the law having no means to decide upon this matter. If the least benefit or advantage be received by the promisor from the promisee, or a third person, or if the promisee sustain any, the least injury or detriment, it will constitute a sufficient consideration to render the agreement valid." Since that
time, the cases have continuously drawn the same conclusion,' 0 and there is no
requirement that the respective undertakings or obligations shall be equal to
If then, there is the least detriment to
or commensurate with one another.1

200 Mo. App. 442, 207 S. W. 883 (1919); Royal Brewing Co. v. Uncle Sam Oil
Co., 205 Mo. App. 616, 226 S. W. 656 (1920); Banner Creamery Co. v. Judy,
47 S. W. (2d) 129 (Mo. App. 1932), although a suit in equity, in this sense
the principle seems to be the same; Cantrell v. Knight, 72 S. W. (2d) 196
(Mo. App. 1934).
5a. See cases note 5, supra.
6. For an excellent discussion of the problem, see Oliphant, Mutuality of
Obligation in Bilateral Contracts at Law (1925) 25 CoL. L. RsV. 705; (1928)
28 id. at 997. But see Williston, The Effect of One Void Promise in a Bilateral
Agreement (1925) 25 COL. L. Rsv. 857. Cf. Ballentine, Mutuality and Consideration (1914) 28 HARV. L. Ruv. 121; Corbin, Non-Binding Promises as Consideration (1926) 26 CoL. L. Rsv. 550; Cook, Williston on Contracts (1939) 33 ILL. L.
REv. 497, 505; Note (1926) 26 COL. L. Rnv. 724.
7. 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 103E.
8. Id. at § 100.
9. 8 Mo. 316, 319 (1843).
10. Carr v. Card, 34 Mo. 513 (1864); Thompson v. McCune, 333 Mo.
758, 63 S. W. (2d) 41 (1933), stating that loss or detriment to the promisee
as well as a benefit to the promisor is valid consideration; Cox v. A. P. Green
Fire Brick Co., 230 Mo. App. 774, 75 S. W. (2d) 621 (1934).
11. Warren v. Ray County Coal Co., 200 Mo. App. 442, 207 S. W. 883
(1919).
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the promisor or the slightest benefit to the promisee in the situation in question, the contract should be enforced. Coming back to the facts hypothesized
at the outset, clearly B's promise is a legal detriment to him if carried out, as
well as a benefit to S, as B will be bound to buy whatever potatoes S may
grow. S's promise, it would seem, is likewise a legal detriment to him, as he
is bound to do one of two things, namely, raise potatoes and sell to B, or refrain
from raising potatoes, either of which is a detriment. He has given up his
right to raise potatoes and sell to someone else, and for this reason the contract
should be considered a valid one.1 2 In other words, S has an option to perform
in either of two ways, either of which circumscribes the entire freedom of action possessed by him prior to entering into the above agreement, and hence
his promise constitutes, or should constitute, a sufficient consideration to support B's undertaking. This is especially true in view of the fact that the
3
courts say that it is their duty to enforce contracts, not to abrogate them.'
Such a case is, however, to be distinguished from the so-called "will, wish,
or want" contracts, where one promise is actually illusory and, therefore, does
not furnish a consideration for the other promise. Suppose, for example, that
S agreed to sell, and B agreed to buy, as many potatoes as S might elect to sell
to B, without a stipulation either express or implied, that S would sell only to
B. In this situation, S has an option to sell or not to sell, either of which
would be a performance of the agreement. Such a promise by S is not good
consideration for B's return promise, for, if S elected not to sell, there would be
no legal detriment to him, nor would there be a benefit to B, and yet he would
have fully performed his promise according to its terms. This idea is clearly
expressed by the Restatement,14 where it is said: "A promise or apparent promise which reserves by its terms to the promisor the privilege of alternative
courses of conduct is insufficient consideration if any of these courses of con-

12. Ramey Lumber Co. v. Schroeder Lumber Co., 237 Fed. 39 (C. C. A.
7th, 1916); Imperial Refining Co. v. Kanotex Refining Co., 29 F. (2d) 193 (C.
C. A. 8th, 1928); Southwest Dairy Products Co. v. Coffee & Moore, 62 F.
(2d) 174 (C. C. A. 5th, 1932); Burgess Sulphite Fibre Co. v. Broomfield, 180
Mass. 283, 62 N. E. 367 (1902); McMullan v. Dickinson Co., 63 Minn. 405, 65
N. W. 661 (1896); Green v. Lovejoy, 155 Minn. 241, 193 N. W. 173 (1923);
Edison Electric Illuminating Co. v. Thacher, 229 N. Y. 172, 128 N. E. 124
(1920). See 1 WILLSTON, CONTRACTS §§ 104A, 141; Corbin, The Effect of Options on Consideration (1925) 34 YALE L. J. 571; Notes (1922) 7 CORN. L. Q.
147, (1926) 26 COL. L. REV. 724. Cf. Scott v. Moragues Lumber Co., 202 Ala.
312, 80 So. 394 (1918), reaching the same result but on different grounds. See
also City of Holton v. Kansas Power and Light Co., 135 Kan. 58, 9 P. (2d)
675 (1932), although a suit in equity, the requisites of a valid contract are
the same as in an action at law. For a discussion of this see 5 WiLmSTON,"
CONTRACTS §§ 1418, 1425.
13. See Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Century Realty Co., 220 Mo. 522,
525, 119 S.W. 400, 403 (1909).
14. RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS (1932) § 79. To the same effect, see Corbin, Zoc. cit. supra note 12; Patterson, loc. cit. supra note 5; Notes (1929) 42
HARV. L. REv. 829, (1929) 28 MICH. L. REv. 76, (1929) 3 ST. JOHN'S L. REV.
276. Exceptions to this general rule are promises that are voidable because of
infancy, insanity, fraud, et cetera.
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duct would be insufficient consideration if it alone were bargained for." The
Missouri decisions are consistent herewith in general, although for the most
part they express it by saying that such a contract is unilateral or that it
lacks mutuality because one party thereto is not bound, and neither is bound
unless both are bound.15
At times, however, the Missouri courts have not given effect to the distinction suggested between the situation set out at the beginning of the discussion,
and the last mentioned hypothetical situation. This may be seen most clearly
by the case of Cherry v. Vhorn,26 involving a purported contract entered into
on December 29, whereby defendant agreed to sell and plaintiff agreed to buy
all of the stock which defendant might own in a certain corporation the following January 5 (later extended to January 9). The court, in affirming the
judgment sustaining defendant's demurrer to the petition, held the contract
void as lacking in mutuality because defendant did not undertake to deliver a
definite quantity-that is, in effect, because defendant could sell all of his
stock before that time, and thus would not be bound to sell any to plaintiff.' 7
This, however, should not result in the contract being held invalid, as defendant
had purported to bind himself either to sell to the plaintiff or refrain from
owning any stock, either of which should constitute a sufficient consideration,
in view of the fact discussed previously that the obligations of the parties
do not have to be equal. Such decisions cannot well be reconciled in theory with
cases such as Dickson v. Eames,18 where defendant's testator executed certain
notes to plaintiff, payable in a year, with an option to tender payment in six
months and request the transfer of certain stock held by plaintiff. The plaintiff

15. Halloway v. Mountain Grove Creamery Co., 286 Mo. 489, 228 S. W.
451 (1921); Gillen v. Bayfield, 329 Mo. 681, 46 S. W. (2d) 571 (1932); Wright
v. Fuel Oil Co., 114 S. W. (2d) 959 (Mo. 1938); Jones v. Durgin, 16 Mo.
App. 370 (1885); Campbell v. American Handle Co., 117 Mo. App. 19, 94 S.
W. 815 (1906).
See Riddle v. Castner, 202 Mo. App. 584, 587, 209 S. W. 127,
128 (1919); White Oak Coal Co. v. Ed. E. Squier Co., 219 S. W. 693, 697 (Mo.
App. 1920); Saginaw Medicine Co. v. Dykes, 210 Mo. App. 399, 405, 238 S.
W. 556, 557 (1922).
16. 221 Mo. App. 1207, 299 S.W. 598 (1927).
17. Accord: Hirsch & Sons Iron & Rail Co. v. Paragould & M. R. R., 148
Mo. App. 173, 127 S.W. 623 (1910). Plaintiff was to sell all of the rails they
might have. The decision is somewhat weakened as defendant objected that the
contract lacked mutuality in that plaintiff was not bound to have any rails, and
also because defendant was bound to buy only as many as they wanted. However, the writer was unable to discover from the terms of the contract that
defendant had any such option, and the court in sustaining defendant's objection
apparently relied on the first ground stated. Barnes v. Bragg, 198 S. W.
73 (Mo. App. 1917); and see Geo. W. Jennings, Inc., v. Hirsch Rolling Mill Co.,
242 S. W. 1003, 1005 (Mo. App. 1922); Edwards v. Offutt, 229 Mo. App. 496,
78 S.W. (2d) 140 (1934). But see Laclede Const. Co. v. Tudor Iron Works, 169
Mo. 137, 152, 69 S.W. 384, 389 (1902), and Laclede Const. Co. v. T. J. Moss Tie
Co., 185 Mo. 25, 78, 84 S.W. 76, 93 (1904), for two decisions containing dictum
to the contrary. Cf. Tull v. Fletcher 196 Mo. App. 573, 196 S.W. 436 (1917),
which was a suit in equity, and the court cites the two preceding cases and
apparently follows the dicta, without mentioning mutuality or consideration.
18. 134 Mo. App. 373, 114 S. W. 574 (1908).
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agreed, upon such request having been made, either to transfer the stock or
to keep the stock and surrender the notes. Failing such tender, on maturity of
the notes plaintiff could either transfer tLe stock and enforce payment of the
notes, or, in the alternative, retain the stock and surrender the notes. The
court held that both parties were bound and that there was valid consideration,
yet it will be observed that in this case each party could perform in more
ways than one, any of which would constitute a good consideration. The basic
principles involved are the same in both cases, the only difference being that in
cases like the Cherry case one of the options consists of refraining from some
act that the promisor would otherwise have a legal right to do, while in the
Dickson case each option consists of the performance of some affirmative act.
Although such a distinction may be made, it would seem to be one of form
rather than of substance, 19 since refraining from doing an act may involve
just as much limitation on one's freedom of action as affirmative performance.
The Missouri courts, as well as those in other jurisdictions, have, however, held valid numerous contracts very similar to that set out at the beginning of the discussion, where such contracts have involved a buyer's requirements
rather than a seller's production. It is to be noted that in both situations an
actual sale may never take place-the buyer may not have any requirements,
just as the seller may not raise anything. For example, in Royal Brewing Co.
v. Uncle Sami Oil Co.,20 the contract provided that defendant would sell to plaintiff all of his (plaintiff's) requirements of fuel oil for one year. The court
held the contract valid, saying that plaintiff's business was an established one,
so that the quantity of oil needed could be estimated approximately, and thus
one was bound to furnish and the other to buy, the quantity being reasonably
estimated. 21 A like result has been reached in other jurisdictions on the theory
of an implied promise by the seller to continue production or sales, or by the
buyer to maintain his business and take its actual requirements, although
22
either party may, in good faith, cease to have such output or requirements.
The result reached in these cases is satisfactory, but it does not seem that the
validity of such contracts should be made to depend on an approximate ascertainment of the amount involved, or on an implied promise to continue in business.

19. See also in this connection Martin v. Ray County Coal Co., 288 Mo.
241, 232 S. W. 149 (1921), where plaintiff agreed to buy between one hundred
and three hundred tons of coal per day from defendant and the court held the
contract valid.
20. 205 Mo. App. 616, 226 S. W. 656 (1920).
21. Accord: Rozier v. St. Louis & S. F. R. R., 147 Mo. App. 290, 126 S.
W. 532 (1910); Banner Creamery Co. v. Judy, 47 S. W. (2d) 129 (Mo. App.
1932) (suit in equity); Wood v. Saylor Tie and Timber Co., 67 S. W. (2d)
826 (Mo. App. 1934); Cantrell v. Knight, 72 S. W. (2d) 196 (Mo. App. 1934);
see Eaton v. The Wear Coal Co., 125 Mo. App. 194, 202, 101 S. W. 1140, 1142
(1907). But ef. Hudson v. Browning, 264 Mo. 58, 174 S. W. 393 (1915). For
an annotation of similar cases in other jurisdictions, see Notes (1921) 14 A.
L. R. 1300, (1923) 24 A. L. R. 1352, (1931) 74 A. L. R. 476.
22. 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 104A.
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It may be argued, of course, that a court in refusing to give effect to such
a contract as is here under discussion, is influenced by the apparent one-sidedness of the agreement. 23 Yet it is axiomatic that courts of law will not inquire
into the adequacy of consideration.24 Provided such a contract serves a useful
social purpose and violates no rule of public policy, it would seem that the
judicial inclination should be towards enforcement rather than abrogation.
In conclusion, then, it is submitted that the validity of contracts wvhich
leave to the promisor an option of performance in two or more ways, should
be upheld, if, and only if, each course of conduct open to the promisor under the
agreement furnishes a sufficient consideration for the corresponding obligation
of the promisee. Although this necessarily excludes those cases where the
promise of one party is truly illusory, it is further submitted that such a requirement of good and sufficient consideration is, in fact, fully met in the fact
situation first presented.
OZBERT W.

THE

WATKINS, JR.

COMPENSATING USE TAX AND INTERSTATE COiMERCE

In Henneford v. Silas Mason Co.,1 the plaintiffs, appellees, were engaged
in the construction of a dam and brought machinery into the state of Washington purchased at retail in other states. The defendants, the Tax Commission
of Washington, gave notice that the plaintiffs had become subject through the
use of this property to a tax of two per cent of the cost, and made demand for
payment. The Washington legislature had enacted a "compensating tax" of two
per cent on the use of all personal property purchased at retail after May,
1935, based on the purchase price. It was passed along with a state sales tax
and did not apply to the "use of any article of tangible personal property the
sale or use of which has already been subjected to a tax equal to or in excess
of that imposed by this title whether under the laws of this state or of some
other state of the United States."2 If the rate of such other tax was less
than two per cent, the Washington use tax was to be measured by the difference. It was held that "the tax is not upon the operations of interstate commerce, but upon the privilege of use after commerce is at an end." Nor was
the tax "so measured or conditioned as to hamper the transactions of interstate
commerce or discriminate against them."
This taxing statute was passed to probect local merchants, especially those

23.
24.
1.
2.

See Note (1939) 52 HARV. L. REv. 836.
Cases cited notes 10 and 11, supra.
300 U. S. 577 (1937).
Wash. Laws 1935, c. 180, tit. 3, 4.
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Without this statute their customers

would be inclined
4

to go into adjoining states not having a retail sales tax to make their purchases.
The plaintiffs maintained that this tax was a direct burden upon interstate

Goods shipped in interstate commerce are subject to taxation without discrimination, as any other goods in that state, when they have reached
commerce.

5
their destination within that state.

The court held that the goods had "become

part of the common mass of property within the state of destination" and there
was no interference with interstate commerce. The court distinguished the
6
principal case from Baldwin v. G. A. F. Seelig, Inc., on the ground that in the
Baldwin case New York attempted to extend its statute into another state by
determining the price to be paid for milk purchased outside New York.

The

Washington statute did not attempt to fix the price of out of state purposes.
Out of state sellers were permitted to sell at any price they desired, but the
use of such goods was subject to taxation after transit so as to share the
7
burden with goods that were purchased within the state.
The court refused to inquire into the motives behind this statute, citing
8
Metgnano Co. v. Hamilton and Fox v. Standard Oil Co.,

9

where it was held

that collateral purposes or motives in levying a tax within the state's lawful
power are beyond scope of judicial inquiry. A tax will not be held invalid because it accomplishes objectives indirectly which it could not accomplish di10
Each statute is not to be construed separately but other statutes are
rectly.
When the highest court of a state holds that two
or more statutes are to be read together the United States Supreme Court acHere the court considered the sales tax and use tax
cepts this as conclusive."

read in conjunction with it.

together and concluded that the purpose was to put all purchases, both in

3. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Henneford, 81 P. (2d) 786 (Wash. 1938),
cert. denied, 59 Sup. Ct. 483 (1939), involving purchase outside of Washington
of specific order and standby equipment for plaintiff engaged in intrastate and
interstate commerce. The equipment could not be purchased in Washington.
The court said that since the purpose of the use tax was the protection of local
merchants the tax was not applicable to articles not available within the state.
The court further held the tax an unlawful burden on interstate commerce. In
denying certiorari, the United States Supreme Court followed the state court as
to the meaning of the state statute; therefore, the interstate commerce angle
was not considered by the United States Supreme Court.
4. See (1937) 1 MD. L. REv. 263.
5. Woodruff v. Parham, 8 Wall. 123 (U. S. 1868); American Steel and
Wire Co. v. Speed, 192 U. S. 500 (1904); Brown-Forman Co. v. Kentucky, 217
U. S. 563 (1910); Cudahy Packing Co. v. Minnesota, 246 U. S. 450 (1918);
Sonneborn Bros. v. Cureton, 262 U. S. 506 (1923); Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry.
v. Wallace, 288 U. S. 249 (1933); Edelman v. Boeing Air Transport, Inc., 289
U. S. 249 (1933); Monamotor Oil Co. v. Johnson, 292 U. S. 86 (1934); Wiloil
Corp. v. Pennsylvania, 294 U. S. 169 (1935).
6. 294 U. S. 511 (1935).
7. See (1937) 10 So. CALIF. L. REV. 516.
8. 292 U. S. 40 (1934).
9. 294 U. S. 87 (1935).
10. See (1937) 35 MICH. L. Rnv. 1395.
11. Gregg Dyeing Co. v. Query, 286 U. S. 472 (1932).
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state and out of state, on the same footing. 12 Plaintiffs further contended that
the tax in question was not in fact a tax upon the use in Washington but upon
the foreign sale. The basis for this contention was the statute which says that
the use shall not be taxable if the chattel is received through any other means
than a retail purchase. But the court took the position that, just because the
legislature had seen fit to tax the use of chattels that had been bought, it did
not make the tax one upon the sale. A state may select subjects of taxation. 3
It is not compelled to adopt an iron rule of equal taxation; 14 it may classify
broadly the subjects of taxation if it does so on a rational basis.' 5
Considering the sales tax and use tax together, there is no discrimination.
If a tax has been paid in another state, a set-off is allowed for that amount
in Washington. In the end all purchasers have paid the same amount of tax.
In Southern Pacific Co. v. Gallagher,16 plaintiff, a Kentucky corporation,
carrying on intrastate, interstate and foreign commerce over its railroad system which extends through several states and connects with other systems,
purchased tangible personalty, some of which was standard equipment and some
was for improvements, replacements or extensions pursuant to previously drawn
plans. Few, if any, of the supplies were stored very long. For construction on a
large scale the goods were shipped to the California destination and installed
immediately. No new rolling stock was involved. All of the iurchases were
used in interstate commerce. Plaintiff contended that the California use tax'7
as applied to these articles was a burden upon interstate commerce. The court
held that there was a taxable moment when the property had reached the
end of their interstate transportation and had not begun to be consumed in
interstate operation. At that moment, the tax on storage and use-retention
and exercise of a right of ownership, respectively, was effective. The interstate
movement was complete. The interstate consumption had not begun. The
court further said that there was no discrimination or tax upon operations in
interstate commerce, but a tax upon a taxable event in the state apart from
operation and therefore no interference with interstate commerce. The dissenting
opinion was that this was a tax upon operations and a direct burden upon
interstate commerce.
California's use tax is complemental to their sales tax.'s The use tax applies the same rate as the sales tax for storage, use or other consumption in
the state when purchased from any retailer. Payment under the sales tax exempts the goods under the use tax. A "retailer" is defined in the act as "every
person engaged in the business of making sales for storage, use or other con-

12. Fox v. Standard Oil Co., 294 U. S. 87 (1935).
13. Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U. S. 107 (1911).
14. Bell's Gap R. R. v. Pennsylvania, 134 U. S. 232 (1890).
15. Ohio Oil Co. v. Conway, 281 U. S. 146 (1930).
16. 59 Sup. Ct. 389 (1939).
17. Cal. Stat. 1935, c. 361.
18. Cal. Stat. 1933, c. 1020, as amended, Cal. Stat. 1935, cc. 351, 355, 357.
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sumption;" "use" is the exercise of any right of ownership; and "storage" is
any "keeping or retention." The California statute did not provide for credit
of a tax paid outside the state as the Washington statute did, but the problem
was not presented or decided in the California case. Also the personalty involved in the Henneford case was not connected with any agency of interstate
commerce as in the Southern, Paific Co. case.
Plaintiff contended that the tax is a direct tax upon the privilege of using
instrumentalities in carrying on interstate commerce and is an unconstitutional
burden on commerce. Defendant contended that the tax is upon intrastate storage
and use-namely, retention and installation.
A state is not permitted to tax the privilege of carrying on or operating in
interstate commerce.' 9 Plaintiff cited Helson and Randolph v. Kentucky2 o for
the proposition that a tax on the use of supplies and equipment is a tax on
commerce. Privileges may be closely connected with interstate commerce, and
yet be regarded as far enough removed for the purposes of taxation. 21 The court
considered in its decision here the goods which were immediately installed upon
arrival, and concluded that there was an interval between the interstate transportation and the consumption in interstate operation, and that this interval
was sufficient for the tax on storage and use to become applicable.
A tax upon installation, even though it does have the same effect as a tax
upon consumption or operation, does not necessarily render it bad;22 there must
be a discrimination or such a tax on operation as to amount to a state interference. But plaintiff contended that the events here were so closely related
as to be a part of interstate commerce. It was held that the taxable events were
all intrastate and an analogy is drawn to Puget Sound Stevedoring Co. v. State
Tax Comm. 23 The court distinguished Ozark Pipe Line Corp. v. Monier24 in
that the tax there was upon the right to do business and the taxpayer was
engaged exclusively in interstate business; while in the instant case the tax
was upon events outside of interstate commerce. Where there is intrastate or
local activity as well as interstate commerce, the local activity may be taxedthe effect upon interstate commerce being too remote or incidental to invalidate
25
the tax.

19. Case of State Freight Tax, 15 Wall. 232 (U. S. 1872); Telegraph Co.
v. Texas, 105 U. S. 460 (1881); Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing Dist., 120
U. S. 489 (1887); Philadelphia & S. Steamship Co. v. Pennsylvania, 122 U.
S. 326 (1887); Leloup v. Port of Mobile, 127 U. S. 640 (1888).
20. 279 U. S. 245 (1929).
21. Utah Power & L. Co. v. Pfost, 286 U. S. 165 (1932); Nashville, C.
& St. L. Ry. v. Wallace, 288 U. S. 249 (1933); Coverdale v. Ark.-La. Pipe
Line Co., 303 U. S. 604 (1938).
22. Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U. S. 250 (1938).
23. 302 U. S. 90 (1937), holding invalid a tax on business of stevedoring,
measured by a percentage of gross receipts from interstate business, but sustaining a similar tax on the intrastate business as an employment agency.
24. 266 U. S.555 (1925).
25. Southern Natural Gas Corp. v. Alabama, 301 U. S. 148 (1937).
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Pacific Telephone and Telegraph Co. v. Gallagher26 involved the same questions as the Southern Pacific Co. case. The tax was applied to equipment and
standby supplies purchased outside California by plaintiff, a telephone and
telegraph company, engaged in intrastate and interstate commerce. The court
in holding the tax valid, citing the Southern Pacific Co. case, said two rights of
ownership were exercised in California-retention and installation-after the
interstate journey ended and before the purchases became part of the telephone
and telegraph system.
Felt & Tarrant Mfg. Co. v. Gallagher27 presented the problem of making
a foreign corporation the collecting agent for California under its use tax.
Plaintiff is an Illinois corporation which manufactures and sells comptometers
through agents in California. All orders are submitted to and approved by the
plaintiff. The machines are shipped from plaintiff's shipping department in
Illinois, and all payments are made directly to plaintiff. Offices are rented by
plaintiff in California in its name; however, plaintiff has never qualified to do
intrastate business. The use tax directs retailers maintaining a place of business in the state, and making sales of tangible personal property for storage,
use or other consumption therein, to collect from the purchaser the tax imposed.
The court, citing Bownan v. Continental Oil Co., 28 Monamotor Oil Co. V. John.
son,29 and the Henneford case, held that this was not a tax upon interstate commerce but upon property after it had come to rest in the state, thus being subject to a nondiscriminatory tax; and that compelling plaintiff to collect the tax
imposed no unconstitutional burden upon interstate commerce or upon the plaintiff.
Other theories of taxation have been suggested to avoid exemption of out
-of state purchases. 30 However, with the constitutionality of the use tax established, it would seem the states have found a suitable means of preventing
evasion of their sales tax by those buying in other states in order to avoid the
local tax.3 ' Thus, not only is the state treasury benefited but local merchants
are protected as well from out of state competition by putting interstate sellers,
32
at least indirectly, on an equal basis with them.
J. BAInt RayNoLDs

26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
Perkins,
N. C. L.
31.
32.

59 Sup. Ct. 396 (1939).
59 Sup. Ct. 376 (1939).
256 U. S.642 (1921).
292 U. S. 86 (1934).:
Lowndes, State Taxation of Interstate Sales (1935) 7 Miss. L. J. 223;
The Sales Tax and Transactions in Interstate Commerce (1934) 12
Ray. 99.
See (1937) 10 So. CALF. L. REv. 516.
See (1937) 1 MD. L. REv. 263.
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